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Clark D. Asay*
Over the past several decades open license movements have proven highly successful
in the software and content worlds. Such movements rely in part on the belief that greater
freedom of use triggers innovative activity that is superior to what a restrictive IP
approach produces. Ironically, such open license movements also rely on IP rights to
promote their vision of freedom and openness. They do so through IP licenses that, while
granting significant freedoms, also impose certain conditions on users such as the
“copyleft” requirement in the software world. Such movements rely on this IP-based
approach due to fears that, without IP rights and such conditions, a tragedy of the
commons would ensue. This Article argues that this IP-based approach, while perhaps
helpful in the beginning, is no longer necessary and in fact prevents the movements from
reaching their full potential. The IP-based approach has this effect by causing significant
transaction costs without offsetting benefits, resulting in a tragedy of the anti-commons.
The IP-based approach also creates the risk of IP trolls in the future, especially in the
copyright sphere. Furthermore, the resulting anti-commons is unnecessary to prevent the
feared tragedy of the commons because most contributors to open movements do so for
reasons that do not fit within the typical tragedy of the commons story. The Article then
examines the benefits of a public domain approach and argues that such an approach
would reduce the wasteful transaction costs, limit the possibility of IP trolls, still satisfy the
purposes of those that contribute materials under open licenses, and better align with the
normative tenets of such movements. To conclude, the Article assesses the merits of a
“Public Domain Act” that would help address obstacles that currently exist in dedicating
materials to the public domain and posits some theoretical implications relating to
innovation based on the experiences of the open license movements and the arguments of
this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
According to conventional wisdom, societies will under-produce
inventions and other creative works without intellectual property (“IP”)
rights.1 IP regimes throughout the world reflect this belief,2 including the
United States Constitution.3 Over the last number of years, furthermore,
countries across the globe have bolstered IP rights in response to
technological changes.4 Doing so, the argument goes, is necessary to ensure
that innovators keep on innovating.
In the past few decades, several “open” models of innovation have
1

ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2011) (indicating that
current convention postulates that IP law seeks to maximize the net social benefit by
offering above-market rewards (i.e., IP rights) to creators of inventions and other works
that would not be created, or not created as soon or as well, without such IP rights).
2
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual
Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1441
(2010).
3
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11 (6th ed. 2012) (Article I, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries…”).
4
Dreyfuss, supra note 2.
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arisen in response to the increasingly expansive IP regimes throughout the
world.5 These movements are based in part on an alternative theory of
innovation, namely, that freedom of use fosters increased collaboration,
which in turn spurs inventive and creative activity.6 Some have thus
identified open models of innovation as anti-IP models of innovation, at
least in the traditional utilitarian sense of IP.7 Ironically, however, these
open movements rely on IP rights to promote their paths of innovation.
They do so through IP licenses that essentially give users the freedom to do
what they’d like with the licensed materials, subject to certain attribution
requirements and in some cases granting the same expansive freedoms to
any additional downstream users of the materials—the so-called “copyleft,
“viral,” “reciprocal,” or “share-alike” effect of such licenses.8
These open license movements have seen significant success in
promoting inventive and creative activity, despite the utilitarian/economic
incentives story that suggests such activity is unlikely.9 Popular consumer
electronic products, such as Android-based phones and tablets, run largely
on free and open source software (“FOSS”).10 The world’s web servers
mostly do as well.11 Popular web browsers such as Firefox are also built on
FOSS.12 Wikipedia content is available under a Creative Commons
5

See generally Creative Commons, History, http://creativecommons.org/about/history
(last visited Oct. 17, 2012) (listing chronologically milestones that the Creative Commons
has reached since its inception in 2001). See also CHRIS DIBONA & SAM OCKMAN, OPEN
SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION (1999) (providing a
comprehensive history of the beginnings of the free and open source software movement).
6
See, e.g., RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED
ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 40-1, 45-56 (2d ed. 2010) (arguing that software
“freedom” enables developers to share their improvements with each other more readily,
which in turn leads to enhanced innovation). See also Creative Commons, About,
http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) (indicating that its goal is to
develop legal and technical infrastructure that “maximizes digital creativity, sharing, and
innovation”).
7
See generally Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 183 (2004) (viewing open licensing movements as introducing new dynamics to
the public domain, and thus the world of non-IP); Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1105, 1127 (2005) (indicating that open license movements “bypass the structural
inequalities of the intellectual property system” and reject “the philosophical basis of
copyright and patent laws”).
8
See infra Part II.
9
See generally MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 17-21 (2008) (discussing the significant successes of FOSS); Steven Weber,
THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004).
10
See generally Android Open Source Project, http://source.android.com/ (last visited
Nov. 9, 2012).
11
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting the many
successes of open licensing movements).
12
Id.
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license.13 Millions of copyright holders authors have released content under
Creative Commons licenses.14 And the list goes on.15
Given these counterintuitive results, commentators have devoted
significant attention to analyzing why these movements have experienced
such tremendous successes. Many commentators have focused on the
reasons why people and firms contribute to open-licensed projects, despite
lacking the typical economic incentives to do so.16 Others have explored the
virtues of open models of innovation themselves in order to explain their
successes.17 And yet others have championed expanding open models of
innovation into other areas in order to generate the same types of benefits
that more mature open-license movements have yielded.18
Yet little if any attention has focused on analyzing whether the
original strategy of the most successful open models of innovation—that is,
relying on IP rights to counter restrictive IP regimes and thereby promote
innovation—is actually the right strategy. Some have argued against certain
aspects of this IP approach, but no one has made a serious case for
abandoning IP rights altogether.19 Most seem to take the IP approach as a
13

Id.
Id. (noting that by Creative Commons’ estimates some 100,000,000 works have
been licensed under Creative Commons licenses).
15
Gavin Newsom, Why Open Source Is the New Software Policy in San Francisco,
MASHABLE TECH, Jan. 22, 2010, http://mashable.com/2010/01/22/open-source-sanfrancisco/ (discussing the city of San Francisco’s adoption of FOSS to serve critical IT
needs).
16
See infra Part II.
17
See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, Or, Linux and the Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE. L.J. 369 (2002) (articulating certain advantages of open, peer-to-peer
production over traditional firm management of innovation, such as more efficient
allocation of human capital to address innovation problems).
18
See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MARYLAND L. REV. 101 (2011) (arguing
that an open model of innovation in the field of personal robotics is necessary in order for
the field to reach its potential); and John R. Ackermann, Toward Open Source Hardware,
34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 183 (2009) (discussing efforts to apply open license principles to
hardware development generally).
19
There has been significant discussion about what types of open licenses serve the
interests of the movements most ably. See, e.g., Free Software Foundation, Why Copyleft?
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-copyleft.html (last updated June 10, 2012) (arguing in
favor of reciprocal licenses over attribution-only licenses in the FOSS world); Eric S.
Raymond, The Economic Case Against the GPL, Apr. 26, 2009,
http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=928 (critiquing the need for reciprocity, but falling short of
critiquing the overall IP approach); Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software:
Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36 RUT. L.J. 53 (2004) (arguing that
reciprocal licenses do more harm than good); Miriam Bitton, Modernizing Copyright Law,
20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65 (2011) (advocating reforming copyright law to reflect many
of the tenets of open license movements, including attribution and reciprocity). But few
have advocated or even explored abandoning IP rights altogether and fully embracing a
14
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given, while others have advocated bolstering it.20 Many, including the
founders of such movements, have argued that IP rights are necessary in
order to prevent a tragedy of the commons.21 If open-licensed materials
were left unprotected by IP rights, the argument goes, free riders would
simply take from the commons while not contributing back into it.22 The
commons would disappear. Others have come to similar conclusions.23
This Article makes the case for a public domain approach to
innovation. Despite the successes of the IP approach, this Article argues that
the FOSS, Creative Commons, and other open license movements would be
better served by abandoning IP rights altogether and fully embracing a
public domain approach to innovation. Several arguments, as laid out more
fully below, support this conclusion. First, in the corporate setting, the
presence of IP rights introduces wasteful transaction costs, without
offsetting benefits, and these costs slow innovation, a primary objective of
such open license movements. A “tragedy of the anti-commons” results.
Second, and importantly, dedicating such materials to the public domain in
most cases still satisfies the complex set of motivations of actors that
choose to contribute to open-licensed projects, at least to the same extent
that the IP approach does. In short, IP rights do not appear to be a primary
motivation of contributors to open-licensed projects. This is yet another
reason to doubt that abandoning the IP approach will lead to less innovation
in open movements, or that a tragedy of the commons would occur without
IP rights.
Third, the rationales for the IP approach no longer appear persuasive
in light of actual experience. The successes of attribution-only licensed
projects and the rise of Cloud computing—where the reciprocal effect of
open licenses is generally not in play—provide just two, yet powerful,
examples. Fourth, dedicating such materials to the public domain would
public domain approach. For one such movement, see http://unlicense.org/ (advocating a
public domain approach to software, at least with respect to copyright).
20
Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: A New Approach
to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
(2012) (proposing a model defensive patent license in order to protect open license
movements from the threat of patents); Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable
Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited
Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271 (2007) (advocating the adoption
of a doctrine of limited abandonment of copyright in order to ensure that users of open
licensed materials continue to retain the public benefits of such materials in perpetuity).
21
See infra Parts III.c and IV.d
22
Id.
23
David McGowan, Legal implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
241, 287-8 (2001) (arguing that without IP rights, the FOSS movement would likely
founder due to free rider issues and contributors to the FOSS movement lacking assurance
that their contributions would not be “stolen” by such free riders).

5
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help eliminate the possibility of IP trolls using open-licensed materials
against “violators” in the future. Such a possibility seems especially
perverse given the purposes of open models of innovation in the first
place—that is, promoting as broad use of the materials as possible. And
finally, clinging to an IP approach only reinforces the legitimacy of
expansive IP rights in the software and content arenas. Conversely,
promoting freedom through public domain dedications better helps create a
true commons and norms of free access and use.
This is not to say that IP rights were not vital in helping establish the
open license movements. To the contrary, IP rights played a role, especially
in the early years of such movements, in helping users see the advantages
and potential of an open model of innovation. But in the majority of cases
the IP approach’s time has come and gone. As this Article will argue, open
models of innovation continue to thrive in spite of IP rights, not because of
them. That these movements would do even better without IP rights
suggests that open models of innovation can and should become viable on
their own. But the crutch of IP rights has prevented these movements from
reaching their full potential. They should thus be abandoned.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an open licensing
primer, including an overview of the general categories of open licenses and
the literature regarding why people and firms contribute to open-licensed
projects. Part II then examines the costs such an IP approach has in the
corporate setting which, this Article argues, no longer serve any purpose
other than stifling innovation, resulting in a tragedy of the anti-commons.
Part III explores the merits of a fully public domain approach and contends
that such an approach eliminates many of these wasteful transaction costs,
satisfies the motivations of most contributors to open-licensed projects,
reduces the possibility of IP trolls, and better aligns—both in theory and in
practice—with the goals of open license movements, all without resulting in
a tragedy of the commons. Part IV explores challenges that a public domain
approach might present, as well as possible solutions to such challenges in
the form of a federal Public Domain Act. Part V concludes by positing
some theoretical implications relating to innovation based on the
experiences of the open license movements and the arguments of this
Article.
I.

OPEN LICENSING

A. Open Licensing 101
The Creative Commons and FOSS movements constitute the two
largest and most successful open license movements in the world. The
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Creative Commons licenses are generally intended for content such as
literary works, music, and other creative works subject to copyright.24 The
FOSS licenses are primarily intended for software.25 Both licensing
movements rely on IP rights to promote their causes.26 Rather than
disclaiming IP rights, licensors of open-licensed materials retain them while
granting downstream users significant rights in the source code27 in the
case of FOSS licenses and the content in the case of Creative Commons
licenses.28
What do the licensors require in return? In both movements, two
general categories of licenses exist.29 The first are what might be called
“attribution-only” licenses. These licenses basically grant downstream users
a license to all of the creators’ rights in copyright—and sometimes patent
rights in the FOSS world—subject to downstream users including relevant
IP notices and a copy of the applicable open license in the documentation of
any additional distribution to third parties.30
The attribution-only licenses are the most permissive type of open
licenses.31 In many ways they are quasi-public domain dedications since
24

See Creative Commons, supra note 6.
See generally Free Software Foundation, About, http://www.fsf.org/about/ (last
visited Oct. 18, 2012) and Open Source Initiative, About the Open Source Initiative,
http://opensource.org/about (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
26
Id. (indicating that Creative Commons licenses “are not an alternative to copyright.
They work alongside copyright and enable you to modify your copyright terms to best suit
your needs”); Stallman, supra note 9, at 129 (stating that “since proprietary software
developers use copyright to stop us from sharing, we cooperators can use copyright to give
other cooperators an advantage of their own: they can use our code” via FOSS licenses
such as the General Public License).
27
That is, the human-readable version of the software that is ultimately translated into
object or binary code, which the relevant device then executes.
28
The Creative Commons movement does include a public domain dedication tool that
users are free to adopt, which will be discussed in more detail infra Part IV.
29
The Creative Commons movement includes other license variations based on
prohibitions against commercial use and making derivative works, which conditions can be
mixed and matched with the attribution and share-alike requirements to come to the
preferred set of license requirements. The most widely used FOSS licenses do not include
any such limitations, and so this paper will not focus on these license variations, although
the basic conclusion of this paper—that a better approach to open models of innovation
would be to abandon IP rights altogether—applies equally to these license variations.
30
For examples of such a license in each
movement, see
http://opensource.org/licenses/BSD-2-Clause (providing the general template of the BSD
2-Clause FOSS license, one of the more popular and widely used attribution-only licenses
in the FOSS movement) and http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode
(providing the general template of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported
license).
31
See Creative Commons, About the Licenses: Attribution Creative Commons BY,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2012) (indicating the attribution25
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subsequent users have no obligations other than providing the required
attribution. Indeed, any third party is entitled to sell the open-licensed
materials under its own brand and license terms, so long as providing the
relevant attribution.32 Doing so in most cases is unrealistic, since potential
purchasers can also obtain the software or content themselves under the
terms of the attribution-only open license directly from the original licensor,
so long as the original licensor continues to license the material
accordingly. But if sellers of the attribution-only software or content modify
the software or content, they need not offer that modified version under the
terms of the original attribution-only license. They can “close” that
modified version and charge for it. In essence, they are free to take from the
commons, but they need not contribute back into it.
The second general category of open licenses dictates the opposite
result. These licenses are generally referred to as “viral,” “reciprocal,” or
“copyleft” licenses in the FOSS context, and “share-alike” licenses in the
Creative Commons world. For ease of reference, this Article will use one
term going forward: “reciprocal” or “reciprocity.” Reciprocity requires
downstream users, upon modifying the content or software and further
distributing it, to make that modified version available to downstream users
under the terms of the original open license.33 Any unmodified version that
the downstream user distributes must also remain under the original open
license terms.
One of the basic purposes of reciprocal licenses, therefore, is to
prevent downstream users from taking from the commons while not
contributing back into it. In the words of Eben Moglen, long a leading
figure in the FOSS movement, reciprocity serves to prevent “defections”
from the FOSS movement.34 The FOSS and Creative Commons movements
thus use reciprocal IP licenses to lock software and content into their
versions of openness and freedom.
Reciprocal licenses in the FOSS world also often explicitly—and, in
only license as its “most accommodating of licenses offered”).
32
See Open Source Initiative, Frequently Asked Questions: Can Open Source Software
Be Used for Commercial Purposes?, http://opensource.org/faq#commercial (last visited
Oct. 18, 2012) (indicating that FOSS can be used for commercial purposes, while
cautioning that reciprocal licenses might prevent subsequent users from imposing
additional restrictions on the FOSS, which attribution-only licenses do not do).
33
See,
e.g.,
Free
Software
Foundation,
What
Is
Copyleft?,
http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ (last updated Oct. 6, 2012) (providing a general overview of
how copyleft works) and Creative Commons, Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported
(Creative Commons BY-SA 3.0), http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ (last
visited Oct. 18, 2012) (providing a definition of “share-alike).
34
Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Fee Software and the Death of Copyright,
June
28,
1999,
at
22,
available
at
http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/anarchism.pdf.
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other cases, some have argued, implicitly35—grant downstream users a
patent license while also requiring anyone that contributes to and further
distributes the software to similarly grant patent licenses to downstream
users.36 The patent licenses in FOSS reciprocal licenses vary in scope and
form, but the general patent license concept appears in a number of
important reciprocal FOSS licenses.37 Such patent reciprocity precludes
patent suits from users and distributors of FOSS, thus keeping the FOSS
commons open and free to use, at least with respect to those that benefit
from it.38 For instance, such patent reciprocity would preclude a corporate
entity from taking FOSS, modifying it, distributing it, and then asserting
patent rights with respect to its modifications to the FOSS against any
downstream users.39
Directly monetizing reciprocal-licensed materials is difficult. In
many reciprocal licenses there is nothing explicitly forbidding using the
materials for commercial purposes. In fact, some founders of the open
license movements suggest commercial use is encouraged.40 However,
because the reciprocal licenses dictate that the materials and any modified
versions thereof remain under the original open license terms, charging
royalties for such materials becomes impossible because anyone that
receives a copy receives it under the terms of the original reciprocal license
terms and is thus free to distribute additional copies to any other third

35

See, e.g., Florian Mueller, GPLv2’s Implicit Patent License and Dalvik, June 6,
2011, LWN.NET, http://lwn.net/Articles/446323/ (noted FOSS activist confirming the
industry understanding that the second version of the General Public License includes an
implicit patent license).
36
See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, The General Public License Version 3.0: Making or
Breaking the FOSS Movement?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 265, 288-91 (2008)
(summarizing the patent provisions of the newest version of the General Public License).
37
Some reciprocal licenses have additional requirements. For instance, in 2007 the
Free Software Foundation released version three of the General Public License (“GPL3”),
one of the FOSS world’s most popular licenses. In addition to its controversial patent
provisions, GPL3 imposes significant requirements on users of GPL3-licensed software
with respect digital rights management technology used in connection with such GPL3licensed software. The Creative Commons movement includes a slate of six different
license options, some of which prohibit commercial use of the Creative Commons-licensed
content, while another option simply prohibits modifications. Though providing such
options, Creative Commons designates these as not “Free Culture Licenses.”
38
Asay, supra note 36.
39
Asay, supra note 36.
40
See Moglen, supra note 34 (indicating that FOSS enables competitors of proprietary
software companies to more ably compete, and in response to suggestions that FOSS is
anti-commercial, “[n]othing could be further from the truth”); Stallman, supra note 6, at 4
(indicating that FOSS does not mean “noncommercial” and that commercial FOSS is “very
important”).
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party.41 Consequently, any attempts to charge royalties will likely fail
because once a copy is distributed under the reciprocal license, costless
copies will almost certainly become available.
B. Explaining the Open Licensing Paradox
Why do creators contribute software and content under open
licenses? Prevailing legal theory suggests that without direct economic
interests, such creators will not have the right set of incentives to create and
innovate. Consequently, no significant innovative activity will occur. And
in the case of the FOSS and Creative Commons movements, finding direct
economic motivations for the owners of such materials is often difficult
since downstream users have such expansive rights in the open-licensed
materials.
Commentators have provided a number of explanations for this
apparent paradox. Studies suggest that parties that contribute to FOSS
projects do so based on a complex mix of intrinsic and extrinsic motives.
For instance, contributors may participate in FOSS projects due to the
“signaling effects” of their development activity: though not gaining direct
economic remuneration, they may profit from reputational benefits and gain
useful experience that improves their future career opportunities.42 Other
surveys suggest that some contributors participate simply because they
enjoy the sense of creativity that comes with their participation and sharing
knowledge with others.43 Indeed, Eben Moglen suggests that creativity by
41

See, e.g., Free Software Foundation, The GNU General Public License, Version 3,
Preamble, June 29, 2007, available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0.html
(stipulating that “if you distribute copies of…a program [licensed under the General Public
License], whether gratis or for a fee, you must pass on to the recipients the same freedoms
that you received…[and] that they, too receive or can get the source code).
42
See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Simple Economics of Open Source, 14-8, (2000),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=224008 (discussing the “signaling
incentives” that motivate software programs to participate in FOSS projects); Josh Lerner
& Jean Tirole, The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond, 7-11
(2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10956 (postulating many of the same
signaling incentives that motivate software programmers while also reviewing extant
surveys that confirm that such incentives do in fact motivate programmers to contribute
time and resources to open-licensed projects); and Sebastian V. Engelhardt, What
Economists Know About Open Source Software: Its Basic Principles and Research Results,
10-2 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1759976
(providing a literature review of relevant studies done on the motivations of programmers
in contributing to open licensed projects). In addition to these surveys and studies
specifically addressing the FOSS context, recent academic work has also analyzed the nonpecuniary reasons that people and firms innovate more broadly. See Jeanne C. Fromer,
Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745 (2013).
43
See Engelhardt, supra note 42.
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and large explains why individual contributors participate in FOSS
development.44
The Free Software Foundation and its constituents, copyright holder
of a number of important FOSS projects, are primarily motivated by
idealism and a strong sense of what is “right” in the software world—that
is, that software wants and deserves to be “free.”45 Though tolerating
attribution-only licenses in limited cases, the FSF licenses most of its
projects under reciprocal licenses and claims doing so has been a great
success at pushing software into the FOSS commons that otherwise would
have remained “closed.”46 Similar rationales have influenced other IP rights
holders in adopting reciprocal licenses for their content or software.47
Firms may contribute to open-licensed projects in order to promote
an alternative to their rivals’ products.48 This rationale helps explain why so
many corporate actors participated in the FOSS movement early on: in
order to promote an alternative—Linux—to Microsoft’s dominant operating
system.49 It also explains in part Google’s sponsorship of the Android OS as
an alternative to Apple’s iOS.50 Relatedly, firms often contribute to openlicensed projects because they use and benefit from the projects and
therefore seek to improve and influence them.51 If the project adopts their
contributions, for instance, this can mean less engineering efforts required
later on to implement those same changes with each new version of the
44

Moglen, supra note 34, at 7, 23-6.
Stallman, supra note 6, at 40-1.
46
Id. at 129-31 (listing specific examples of where the reciprocity requirement
allegedly forced companies to contribute to the FOSS commons).
47
See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Licensing, 12-4 (2002), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=354220 (indicating that the
possibility of third parties “hijacking” non-reciprocal-licensed FOSS projects leads some
projects to adopt reciprocal licenses). For examples of IP rights holders adopting or
advocating reciprocal licenses for their materials, along with their rationales for doing so,
see Dylan Harris, Why Copyleft, 2003, http://dylanharris.org/prose/gal/ycl.shtml; and Linux
Reviews, Why Copyleft Is Important for the Human Species as a Whole,
LINUXREVIEWS.ORG
(last
visited
Oct.
19,
2012),
http://linuxreviews.org/features/copyright_vs_copyleft/index.html.en
(indicating
that
reciprocity helps ensure that the commons remains open and robust).
48
See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
183, 192-93 (2004); and Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do
Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH 1, 23 (2006).
49
Merges, supra note 48.
50
See, e.g., Jack Whalen, 10 Things Android Phones Do Better Than the iPhone,
TECHREPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/10things/10-thingsandroid-phones-do-better-than-the-iphone/1131 (indicating that one of the advantages of
Android compared to Apple’s iOS is that the Android operating system is FOSS and
therefore available to all developers to improve and modify).
51
See Merges, supra note 48 and Mann, supra note 48, at 21-2.
45
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open-licensed project, as well as triggering innovation in a direction that
benefits the firm.52
Some firms, such as Red Hat, have also found ways to indirectly
monetize open-licensed materials by selling services related to such openlicensed materials.53 Indeed, many firms do not use FOSS as a profit center
per se, but instead use it in connection with complementary products such
as hardware, premium versions of the software, services such as
maintenance, and so forth.54
Conversely, IP rights do not appear to strongly motivate contributors
to open-licensed projects, at least in the traditional utilitarian/economic
incentives sense.55 If they did, one might expect IP rights holders to enforce
their rights more diligently and collect damages when available. While
some case law surrounding open licenses exists, it is extremely limited,56
despite some evidence suggesting that open license compliance is often
rather weak.57 In situations where rights holders have brought cases, they
have typically done so simply in order to enforce the open standards of the
licenses, not in order to obtain monetary damages.58 For instance, in the
FOSS world, the Free Software Foundation’s stated purpose is not to collect
money damages, but to ensure that FOSS remains “free.”59
This result seems unsurprising given that the motivation of most
52

See, e.g., Kevin McEntee, Why We Use and Contribute to Open Source Software,
THE NETFLIX TECH BLOG, Dec. 10, 2010, http://techblog.netflix.com/2010/12/why-we-useand-contribute-to-open.html (indicating that one of the reasons that Netflix contributes to
FOSS projects is because “[b]y sharing our bug fixes and new features back out into the
community, the community then in turn continues to improve upon bug fixes and new
features that originated at Netflix and then we complete the cycle by bring those
improvements back into Netflix”).
53
Mann, supra note 48, at 35.
54
Mann, supra note 48, at 25.
55
Amy Kapczynski, The ACreative Commonsess to Knowledge Mobilization and the
New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 869-70 (2008) (noting that
innovation in the FOSS world does not “rely on the incentivizing effect of IP rights”).
56
Heather J. Meeker, Open Source and the Age of Enforcement, 4 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 267 (2012) (providing a catalogue of FOSS-related lawsuits).
57
Mark A. Lemley & Ziv Shafir, Who Chooses Open-Source Software?, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 139, 151-2 (2011) (suggesting that, aCreative Commonsording to their survey results,
users of FOSS often fail to meet some of the basic obligations of FOSS licenses).
58
Meeker, supra note 56, at 286-7 (indicating that most FOSS-related suits up until
now have focused largely on “advocacy” for the FOSS cause, while noting that a new type
of litigant is emerging in the FOSS space that brings suits based on the same types of
rationales as traditional IP rights holders).
59
Free Software Foundation, License Violations and Compliance,
http://www.fsf.org/licensing/compliance (last visited Oct. 19, 2012) (indicating that [m]any
copyright holders seek monetary damages when their license is violated. We do not — we
only want violators to come back into compliance, and help repair any harm done to the
free software community by their past actions”).
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parties in contributing to open-licensed projects is not directly economic in
nature, i.e., for most, the purpose is not to obtain financial rewards from the
open-licensed materials directly (either through royalties, license fees, or
collecting damages via litigation), even if a commercial enterprise is built
around the open-licensed materials (e.g., Red Hat). But as the remainder of
this Article will demonstrate, using IP rights as the means to the end of
enhanced innovation in open movements has its limits and in fact has
significant negative consequences. The IP approach often stymies
innovation because it introduces wasteful transaction costs. The resulting
tragedy of the anti-commons, furthermore, is unnecessary since the primary
rationale for adopting the IP approach—to avoid a tragedy of the
commons—proves unpersuasive on a number of levels. While the IP
approach was perhaps necessary in the beginning in order to help establish
the movements, its continuing predominance only prevents open models of
innovation from reaching their full potential. The next sections examine the
ways in which IP rights have this effect.
II.

OPEN LICENSING IN THE CORPORATE WORLD
A. From Enemies to Frenemies

Firms have been involved with the open license movements since
their beginnings. Early on, such involvement might be described as hesitant
in the best case scenario and hostile in the worst. Such initial hesitancy and
hostility were perhaps understandable. Since all open licenses disclaim any
sort of liability or warranty, firms naturally worried about using such openlicensed materials without any sort of guarantee or backing from the
licensor.60 Furthermore, the language of open licenses is often opaque,
leaving firms in doubt about how they were permitted to use such
materials.61 Contributing technology and content under open licenses—
whether intentionally or unintentionally via the effects of reciprocity—also
seemed counterintuitive since doing so essentially gave up firms’ IP rights
in any contributed materials, at least in the traditionally restrictive sense.62
Last and related, firms doubted that such licensing models were sustainable;
60

Jon Christiansen et al., Redefining “Free”: A Look at Open Source Software
Management, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 425 (2010) (comments of Mr. Joseph A.
Herndon); Lothar Determann & Gary Shapiro, Handling Open Source Software Risks in
Commercial and M&A Transactions, 956 PLI/PAT 227, 231 (2009).
61
See, e.g., HEATHER J. MEEKER, THE OPEN SOURCE ALTERNATIVE: UNDERSTANDING
RISKS AND LEVERAGING OPPORTUNITIES 183-217 (2008) (discussing at length the varying
conflicting interpretations of the GPL, one of FOSS’s most prominent licenses).
62
Edmund J. Walsh & Andrew J. Tibbetts, Reassessing the Benefits and Risks of Open
Source Software, 22 NO. 1 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 9 (2010).
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from their perspective, firms saw little reason why anyone, let alone large
numbers of people and firms, would spend significant amounts of time and
effort contributing to open-licensed projects absent direct economic
incentives to do so.63
But while some of these concerns remain relevant today, firms’ have
largely embraced use of open-licensed materials. According to the research
firm Gartner, for instance, 85% of firms use FOSS in some form or another,
with the remaining holdouts planning to in the near future.64 Even
Microsoft, long the perceived antithesis of the FOSS movement, has come
to embrace some forms of FOSS development.65 Creative Commons also
provides a directory of hundreds of organizations that release millions of
pieces content under various Creative Commons licenses.66 Use of openlicensed materials is pervasive and only promises to become more so.67
What explains this change? Part of the explanation is simply that
firms have been proven wrong; open models of innovation are sustainable.
Firms may have been justified in doubting that armies of volunteers, as well
as other firms, would contribute vast amounts of time and resources into
making technology and other content available, but that is precisely what
has happened—and continues to happen. The previous section explored the
reasons for this.
In addition to the sustainability of open models of innovation, their
advantages have also become more apparent. In the FOSS world, the Open
Source Initiative was founded in 1997 in part to more effectively sell the
corporate world on the advantages of FOSS development by abandoning the
more confrontational approach of the Free Software Foundation.68 Eric
63

See Robert L. Glass, The Sociology of Open Source: Of Cults and Cultures, IEEE
SOFTWARE, May-June 2000, at 104; and David Lancashire, Code, Culture and Cash: The
Fading Altruism of Open Source Development, 6 FIRST MONDAY 3 (Dec. 3, 2001),
http://www.firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1488/1403
(critiquing the typical reasons advanced for why open development occurs, and suggesting
that market conditions largely explain its occurrence, which in turn suggest that the open
movements may not be sustainable based on such typical reasons).
64
Gartner, Gartner Says as Number of Business Processes Using Open-Source
Software Increases, Companies Must Adopt and Enforce an OSS Policy, GARTNER
NEWSROOM, Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=801412.
65
Elizabeth Montalbano, Microsoft Revising 'Us vs. Them' Attitude Toward Open
Source
Via
Powerset
Acquisition,
COMPUTERWORLD,
Dec.
9,
2008,
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9123089/Microsoft_revising_us_vs._them_attitud
e_toward_open_source_via_Powerset_acquisition?taxonomyId=18&pageNumber=2
(discussing a change in Microsoft’s strategy vis-à-vis FOSS).
66
Creative
Commons,
Content
Directories,
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Content_Directories (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
67
See also supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
68
See Asay, supra note 36, at 270.
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Raymond’s seminal work, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, was also pivotal
in more clearly articulating the advantages of an open and widely dispersed
model of innovation in the FOSS world; his most famous line from the
work crisply made the case for an open model of innovation: “given enough
eyeballs, all [software] bugs are shallow.”69 His work helped convince the
Netscape Communications Corporation to release the source code for the
Netscape Communicator browser and start the Mozilla project, a seminal
event in the corporate world.70 Since then, corporate use, sponsorship of,
and significant contributions to open-licensed projects have exploded:
Google’s Android operating system,71 Red Hat’s Linux distribution,72 and
Apple’s significant contributions to the Webkit browser project73 are just a
few of the more well-known examples.
Over time, firms have also simply become more familiar with open
licenses and using materials licensed under them. Although the meaning of
various open licenses remains murky in many cases, the widespread
adoption of open-licensed materials and industry understandings of
permitted uses have helped firms grow more comfortable using such
materials.74
What role have IP rights played in these changing attitudes? Their
primary effect has been to ensure that firms and others take the conditions
of open licenses seriously. Thus, in some cases IP rights (and reciprocity in
particular) may have helped prevent firms from simply taking from the
commons while not contributing back into it. This seems especially true
early on in the case of Linux, where firms were so desperate for an
alternative to Microsoft’s dominant operating system that even an
unconventional licensing scheme such as the General Public License was
more palatable than the alternative of continuing to cede ground to
69

ERIC STEVEN RAYMOND, Release Early, Release Often in THE CATHEDRAL AND THE
BAZAAR
(2000)
(hereinafter
“BAZAAR”),
available
at
http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/ar01s04.html.
70
ERIC STEVEN RAYMOND, Epilog: Netscape Embraces the Bazaar in BAZAAR,
available
at
http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedralbazaar/ar01s13.html (citing an e-mail from Eric Hahn, executive vice-president and chief
technology officer of Netscape at the time, which stated: “On behalf of everyone at
Netscape, I want to thank you for helping us get to this point in the first place. Your
thinking and writings were fundamental inspirations to our decision”).
71
See generally Android Open Source Project, http://source.android.com/ (last visited
Nov. 9, 2012).
72
See generally http://www.redhat.com/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
73
See generally The Webkit Open Source Project, http://www.webkit.org/ (last visited
Nov. 9, 2012).
74
See, e.g., Alan Stern & A. Clifford Allen, Open Source Licensing, 1109 PLI/PAT
645, 673-4 (2012) (discussing general industry understandings with respect to certain
aspects of reciprocity).
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Microsoft.75
But reciprocity in particular and the IP rights approach in general
have outlived their usefulness in many cases. Firms and users of openlicensed materials have decades of experience in coming to appreciate the
virtues of open models of innovation. This does not mean that firms always
elect to take advantage of such virtues, but their merits in many contexts are
largely uncontroversial. At this stage IP rights more often than not simply
introduce wasteful transaction costs that inhibit innovation.76 While it is
often argued that such costs are necessary in order to protect against a
tragedy of the commons, there are significant reasons to doubt this
argument, as discussed more fully below. The following sections first
explore the significant costs that firms incur in seeking to comply with open
license and self-imposed requirements, followed by an analysis of why such
costs are unnecessary in order to sustain open models of innovation.
B. Transaction Costs
Despite the significant advantages of using and contributing to openlicensed projects, firms still face risks in doing so. And such risks are
largely the result of IP rights. For instance, firms face possible remedies
under copyright law—including injunctions and statutory damages—for
failure to comply with open licensing requirements such as reciprocity and
attribution.77 Furthermore, the reciprocal effect of certain open licenses has
the potential to subject a firm’s proprietary materials to the terms of the
open license. In such a case, the firm has no means by which to prohibit
third parties from further licensing the materials under the same terms, even
if the firm later licenses it under different terms. The firm may also
compromise significant patent rights depending on the applicable open
license and technology at issue.
As firms seek to address these risks, they incur significant
transaction costs, thereby slowing innovation. The resulting logjam might
75

See Dibona et al., supra note 5, Introduction (outlining the dominant position that
Microsoft held in the server software space for years, which helped create the original
impetus for a FOSS alternative).
76
Some have argued that open licenses actually reduce transaction costs by providing
a familiar licensing mechanism that both developers and users of open-licensed materials
can rely on. See Schultz & Urban, supra note 20, at 9. While it is likely true that over time
greater familiarity with the most popular open licenses has helped reduce transaction costs
that would result absent a better alternative, this Article argues that one such better
alternative that would reduce transaction costs even further is a straightforward public
domain approach.
77
Case law in the US and elsewhere has confirmed that open licenses are enforceable
under copyright law. See generally Meeker, supra note 56.
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be viewed as a form of a “tragedy of the anticommons,” in the parlance of
Professor Michael Heller,78 because such IP rights and the resulting
transaction costs lead to underuse of the relevant resources.79 Superficially,
the anticommons in open-license movements may appear similar to others
simply because the end result is similar. But the tragedy of the anticommons
in open license movements is even more tragic because the result is
completely antithetical, generally, to the purposes of such movements and
their contributors. Indeed, unlike in other anticommons contexts, where
numerous IP rights holders may withhold permission to use materials or
hold out until a royalty is paid (and thereby cause significant transaction
costs that inhibit use of the resource),80 in open license movements the
purpose is generally to encourage as wide use as possible, absent royalties
or any other form of economic remuneration. As in other anticommons
contexts, the transaction costs in open license movements result from the
assignment of IP rights to numerous owners. But, as this Article argues,
they result for no good reason.
These transaction costs can generally be grouped into the following
categories: 1) intake costs, 2) M&A costs, 3) internal management costs,
and 4) outbound costs. A discussion of each follows.
1. Intake Costs
In order to address the risks of using open-licensed materials, firms
often implement policies for reviewing and approving open-licensed
materials before they come into the firm.81 While obtaining a specific
example of such a policy from a firm is difficult given confidentiality and
attorney-client privilege concerns, a common approach includes requiring
formal approvals at the legal, business, security, and technical levels.82
Thus, in many firms each use of an open-licensed project requires vetting,
regardless of what type of open license is concerned, be it attribution-only
or reciprocal.
78

Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
79
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998).
80
Id.
81
T. Robert Rehm, Jr. Navigating the Open Source Minefield: What’s a Business to
Do?, 10 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 289, 314-7 (2010) (discussing generally the
types of considerations companies may take into aCreative Commonsount when
implementing such policies).
82
See Karen F. Copenhaver, Open Source Policies and Processes for In-Bound
Software, 1079 PLI/PAT 785, 798-9 (2012) (indicating that many organizations establish a
cross-discipline team of individuals that decides upon each use of FOSS at the company).
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In the FOSS world, the costs of doing so can be significant.83 For
instance, engineers may wait significant periods of time before obtaining
relevant approvals for a software solution that they simply want to test and
may not even ultimately adopt.84 Such waiting periods are typically longer
if the request concerns a reciprocal license due to the thornier issues that
come with such licenses.85 In some cases firm leaders may approve
materials under a reciprocal license, but impose significant restrictions on
their use in order to avoid the effects of reciprocity. Such restrictions lead to
costs that ultimately slow innovation.
Other intake costs result from firms’ own internal rules about
categories of open licenses. For instance, some firms simply prohibit certain
license types because of the scope of the reciprocity requirement in such
licenses.86 Apple prohibits developers in their app store from using
reciprocal licensed software.87 Such prohibitions can lead to a number of
costs. For instance, due to the self-imposed unavailability of a solution
licensed under a banned license, the firm may end up using its own
resources to develop the solution itself or pay licensing fees to a third party
for a commercially available solution.88 Furthermore, if materials under
such a prohibited license do make their way in the door despite the policy,
and the firm discovers it later, the firm may undertake significant remedial
action in order to remove and replace the offending materials.89
In order to help formulate, implement, and administer such intake
policies, some firms have even hired lawyers and technical personnel

83

See MEEKER, supra note 61, at 70-1 (indicating that the information gathering and
legal analysis components of compliance work are often costly and time-consuming,
especially the more complex an organization is).
84
Id. at 800-1 (discussing the practical need at firms that implement open license
policies to guarantee some sort of response time to requests in order to help ensure that the
policy succeeds).
85
Eli Greenbaum, Open Source Semiconductor Core Licensing, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 131, 139-40 (2011) (indicating that the scope and application of reciprocal licenses
in the FOSS world remain contentious topics, and commercial software developers
therefore remain wary of incorporating such materials into their proprietary products).
86
See MEEKER, supra note 61, at 75, 121 (indicating different licenses that firms often
ban and suggesting that a common approach to FOSS corporate policies is to include
different “black,” “white,” and “gray” lists with respect to what FOSS licenses are
permitted).
87
See Peter Ibbotson, Windows Phone 7 Developer Tools: A First Look, ZDNET, Sept.
27,
2010,
http://www.zdnet.com/windows-phone-7-developer-tools-a-first-look3040090296/.
88
Rehm, supra note 81, at 318 (indicating that firms may seek such commercial
solutions in the event that audits reveal software incompatible with the firm’s open license
policy).
89
Id.
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specifically focusing on open license issues.90 Firms also often seek aid
from outside counsel or vendors specializing in FOSS compliance such as
Black Duck Software, Palamida, or Open Logic.91 All of these activities in
the cumulative lead to significant transaction costs that redirect efforts from
innovation to legal and internal firm compliance.
Another cost related to intake involves negotiating commercial
license agreements with third parties. Increasingly firms ask for
representations and warranties around open-licensed materials and an
indemnity covering non-compliance with the relevant open licenses as part
of the negotiation.92 In some cases the firm may even ask for an audit of the
third party’s materials in order to detect and review use of open-licensed
materials in the products or services being licensed or sold to it.93 Such
costs are similar to those incurred in the M&A context (discussed directly
below), although generally on a smaller scale depending on the size of the
commercial deal.
2. M&A Costs
Firms also incur significant transaction costs related to open licenses
when involved with an acquisition.94 Often a significant part of the due
diligence of a target company focuses on whether the target company uses
open-licensed materials and, if it does, whether the target company is in
compliance with the open licenses’ requirements and whether the use of
open-licensed materials has compromised in any way the target’s key
assets.95 Since use of open-licensed materials is so pervasive, this issue
becomes relevant in most acquisitions, and becomes even more relevant
when the target’s products and services focus on software or content
products and services.96
90

Copenhaver, supra note 82, at 799 (discussing the growing trend of hiring personnel
whose primary responsibility is to ensure open-license compliance).
91
See, e.g., Stern & Allen, supra note 74, at 667 (discussing the availability of thirdparty vendors that perform such services).
92
Diana Marina Cooper, Open Source Legal Concerns, 29 NO. 23 LAW. PC 6 (2012).
93
Copenhaver, supra note 82, at 803 (indicating that customers will often ask for lists
of open-licensed materials used in a product).
94
See generally Heather J. Meeker, The Open Source Alternative, Open Source in
Mergers and Acquisitions and Other Transactions, 928 PLI/PAT 341 (2008).
95
Id. See also Rehm, supra note 81, at 321 (identifying use of open-licensed materials
as a significant issue in M&A activity that firms should take into when developing their
own open license policies) and Lothar Determann & Gary Shapiro, Handling Open Source
Software Risks in Commercial and M&A Transactions, 956 PLI/PAT 227, 235-6 (2009)
(specifying the types of information acquirors typically request with regards to open
licensed materials).
96
Meeker, supra note 94, at 345-8.
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Such due diligence can be significant. The acquiror generally
requests a list of all open-licensed materials used at the firm, descriptions of
how they are used, and the applicable open license.97 Generating such lists
can be such a significant burden on the target company that the parties will
instead bring in an outside vendor to perform an audit to obtain the relevant
information.98 Some firms make such audits a prerequisite for any
acquisition.99 Even once the audit is done, firms will devote significant
amounts of time reviewing the results, implementing remedial actions, and
negotiating over how such results impact the terms of the merger
agreement.100
3.

Internal Management Costs

Once open-licensed materials find their way in the door, whether
through M&A activity or normal day-to-day intake, firms incur additional
costs in managing them on an ongoing basis. Firms often segregate openlicensed materials from proprietary materials in their internal management
systems in order to help keep track of how the materials are being used and
to prevent the open-licensed materials from being intermingled with other
materials.101 Doing so results in costs related to building the technical
solutions for such internal management as well as personnel time spent
administering them. Firms may also outsource developing such internal
management solutions to third parties.102 Even if such a third-party solution
97

Id. at 346-8.
For instance, Black Duck is one of the more popular solutions that firms use to
conduct such audits. See generally Black Duck, The New Due Diligence: Assessing and
Protecting Your Software Asset Value in Mergers, Acquisitions and Financing Rounds,
available
at
http://www.blackducksoftware.com/noindex/salesforce/pdfs/New_Due_Diligence_UL.pdf
(last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
99
See, e.g., Daniel Egger & Matthew Hogg, Open Source Software IP Risk Audits: The
Emerging Due Diligence Standard for Technology M&A Transactions, 3, available at
http://osriskmanagement.com/downloads/Open%20Source%20Software%20IP%20Risk%2
0Audits.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2012 (indicating that some companies perform such
audits with each transaction. It is also the personal experience of the author that firms often
mandate such scans with each transaction).
100
Determann & Shapiro, supra note 95, at 235-41 (discussing generally factors
related to open licenses that firms take into account when negotiating agreements).
101
See MEEKER, supra note 61, at 53-71 (discussing the need generally for firms to
conduct due diligence and “compliance analysis” on their software code bases in order to
avoid mixing software subject to incompatible rights).
102
See, e.g., Blackduck, The Business Case for Automating Open Source Code
Management,
2012,
available
at
http://osrc.blackducksoftware.com/learningcenter/whitepapers/ (discussing the cost savings
for firms in relying on a third-party solution such as Blackduck offers for managing FOSS
98
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is more efficient, it nonetheless costs firms significant amounts of time,
money, and effort.103
Other internal management costs result when firms discover errors
in information about open-licensed materials that the firm previously vetted
and approved. The costs of monitoring and then remediating such errors—
either by removing and replacing the open-licensed materials or updating
them in order to correct the errors—can also result in significant costs for
firms.104 Firms will also often spend significant amounts of time training
employees on their open license policies and rely on outside experts to help
perform such training.105
4. Outbound Costs
Firms also incur a variety of significant costs when open-licensed
materials leave the firm. These occur in a number of ways. First, when
firms distribute open-licensed materials, they incur costs in ensuring that
they comply with their own internal policies and the open licenses
themselves, since distribution is generally the event that triggers open
license compliance obligations.106 Firms will often conduct outbound audits
of materials in order to ensure such internal and legal compliance.107
Because development activities are often dynamic and fast-moving, such
audits can be common even in cases where firms generally conduct intake
reviews and attempt to monitor the use of such materials after intake.108
Firms may develop their own auditing system, which results in its
own upfront costs even if later it helps reduce costs.109 Or, firms often rely
use).
103

Id. at 8-9 (indicating, based on its model, an automated approach reduces FOSS
management costs significantly, but nonetheless still results in licensing and other
administrative costs).
104
See MEEKER, supra note 61, at 71 (indicating that “the larger the organization, and
the more backtracking there is to do, the more difficult the task” in remediating problems
discovered during compliance activities).
105
See, e.g., Linux Foundation, Linux Training Courses, LinuxFoundation.org,
https://training.linuxfoundation.org/courses/open-source-compliance (last visited Oct. 24,
2012) (providing a list of Linux-related training courses regarding compliance and best
practices).
106
See MEEKER, supra note 61, at 27 (indicating that distribution is generally
conditioned upon meeting requirements such as reciprocity and notice). Some licenses,
such as the Affero General Public License, define “distribution” to include making a hosted
software solution available to third parties, but this is the exception more than the rule.
107
See MEEKER, supra note 61, at 71-4.
108
Id. at 71 (indicating that some firms conduct such diligence on an ongoing basis,
simply as a matter of good housekeeping).
109
Id. at 72.
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on a third-party solution, either a vendor that conducts the audit on behalf of
the firm or a third-party auditing system that firms license from such
vendors.110 Using such third-party solutions still results in significant costs,
both in the form of licensing fees to such third parties as well as
implementing such solutions and reviewing the results.
Even in the case of attribution-only licenses, such outbound review
efforts can be significant.111 For instance, in the FOSS world, each source
code file may include a separate copyright notice and license agreement that
needs to be separately cited, typically as part of a legal notices document
that accompanies the outbound product or service. Consequently, engineers,
lawyers, and others will spend significant amounts of time going through
such files, extracting the relevant notices, and compiling them into a legal
notices document.112 Depending on the size of the software distribution and
the number of software files, this exercise can be extremely burdensome.113
Even in cases where some amount of automation helps improve
efficiencies, because of the possibility of IP remedies, automation is rarely
if ever fully relied on.
Reciprocal licensed materials increase the costs of making outbound
distributions. If a firm intends to distribute software that includes materials
under a reciprocal license, for instance, the firm will often review how such
materials are integrated with other materials in order to ensure that no firm
technology, content, or in some cases patents are compromised.114 Such
additional reviews are common even if upon intake certain restrictions were
specified, given that how the materials are used may have changed since the
time of intake and such changes may not have been addressed as part of the
firm’s internal management of such materials.115 Such reviews may lead the
firm to take remedial actions in order to avoid reciprocity obligations.116
Such remedial actions both slow development release cycles and require
significant personnel resources in order to implement them.
Furthermore, because reciprocal licenses require releasing or making
110

Id. at 72-3.
Id. at 83 (indicating that meeting notice requirements is time-consuming, and that
complying with the exact letter of all notice requirements can be literally impossible).
112
Id. at 84-5.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 98 (discussing patent issues that arise when distributing FOSS licensed under
a reciprocal license). See also John Christianson et al, supra note 60, at 52 (discussing an
example of an after-the-fact review that ultimately identified licensing issues that needed
resolution) and Jeffrey D. Osterman, Software Licensing and Open Source, 1109 PLI/PAT
583, 605 (2012) (discussing such reviews).
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The likelihood of these additional reviews also increases because the open-licensed
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available the reciprocal-licensed materials under the terms of the license,
firms expend significant amounts of time and resources compiling and
reviewing the materials to be so released.117 For instance, in the FOSS
world, the firm will need to review and compile all source code files to be
released, and doing so typically requires significant engineering and legal
resources.
Outbound releases of open-licensed materials also result in costs
even once the materials are distributed. For instance, if errors are discovered
in the attributions, then the firm may update the legal notices document to
correct those errors. Or, if the firm discovers that it is not in compliance
with a reciprocity requirement or its own internal policies, then the firm
may incur costs in remediating the non-compliance, either by removing the
non-complying material or coming into compliance with the reciprocity
requirement by releasing, for instance, the required source code in the FOSS
context.118
Another cost related to distribution involves negotiating commercial
agreements with third parties. Third party recipients of a firm’s licensed or
sold materials will often ask for representations and warranties around
open-licensed materials and an indemnity covering non-compliance with
open licenses requirements as part of the negotiation.119 In some cases the
third party may even ask for an audit of the firm’s materials in order to
detect and review use of open-licensed materials in the products or services
being licensed or sold to it.120
Firms also incur significant costs when contributing to openlicensed projects. Why firms might choose to contribute to open-licensed
projects was explored above. But even when contributing to such openlicensed projects is to the firm’s advantage, IP licenses make such
contributions more complicated than they need be. For instance,
contributing materials to an open-licensed project may impact companies’
patent portfolio in the FOSS context, depending on the applicable license.121
117
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May
7,
2010,
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failing to release the source code to GPL-licensed software that they distributed with
certain hardware products).
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Sometimes firms discover such instances of non-compliance themselves and
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compliance. See, e.g., Meeker, supra note 56 (providing an overview of open licenserelated enforcement activities).
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See Determann & Shapiro, supra note 60.
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Copenhaver, supra note 82, at 803 (indicating that customers will often ask for lists
of open-licensed materials used in a product).
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MEEKER, supra note 53, at 139-40.
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Some of these patent licenses are exceedingly broad, so much so that some
firms ban such licenses altogether,122 while other patent licenses suffer from
a lack of clarity, thereby leaving firms in doubt as to how their patent
portfolio may be impacted. Another concern is simply that firms may not
want to give away their technology or content in a manner that limits its
rights to reclaim such materials later on.
In order to address such issues, firms often implement policies
aimed at vetting contributions to open-licensed projects before they are
made.123 Much like intake policies, such contribution policies can result in
significant waiting periods while technical, business, legal, and security
personnel review and approve such contributions. Such policies consume
personnel time in developing and administering them, as well as slowing
the speed of innovation while awaiting approvals. And in some cases, where
approvals are denied, such policies simply prevent innovation rather than
merely slowing it.
C. Worth Every Penny?
All of these efforts result in costs, which in turn slow innovation
since firms could otherwise direct their resources towards innovating. Some
studies suggest that the costs of open license compliance programs can be
extremely high, regardless of how firms conduct them.124 A version of the
tragedy of the anti-commons thereby plays out, despite the reality that most
contributors to open-licensed projects contribute precisely in order to
promote a robust and freely accessible commons.
But is this anti-commons necessary in order to ensure a robust
commons? Supporters of the IP approach argue that these costs are vital to
maintain the movements. This is essentially the Free Software Foundation’s
argument in favor of reciprocal licenses: reciprocity ensures that software
and content stay “free,” and the costs of the IP approach, while not ideal,
are simply the price necessary for a tremendous amount of freely available
innovation.125 Without reciprocity, too many free riders—especially,
perhaps, firms—would result in a commons gutted of its innovative
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See supra notes 86 and 87 and accompanying text.
See generally MEEKER, supra note 61, at 135-51 (providing a general overview of
the types of factors firms take into account when releasing software as FOSS).
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See Blackduck, supra note 102, at 1 (indicating that on average it costs firms
$7,800 per software component annually to effectively manage risks associated with open
licenses, while suggesting that use of its automated risk management tools can help cut
these costs significantly).
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capacity.126 A tragedy of the commons would ensue, the argument goes.
Similarly, though vetting attribution-only licenses does entail some costs,
these costs pale in comparison to the value of the FOSS and content that
contributors are willing to donate to the commons in exchange for the
attribution.127
Furthermore, why focus on the transaction costs of firms at all? The
open license movements were founded in order to benefit society generally,
not to benefit firms. They were also founded in part as a response to the
increasingly aggressive IP stances of firms. And firms remain aggressive
with respect to IP rights, and perhaps have grown even more so in the
intervening years. Thus, the original strategy of fighting restrictive IP rights
with IP rights may remain relevant.
But while open movements may not have been founded to benefit
firms, it is clear that firms greatly benefit the movements. Firms are not
only consumers of open-licensed materials, but significant contributors to
open-licensed projects.128 In the FOSS world, for instance, firms often hire
engineers specifically in order to contribute to open-licensed projects that
the firm supports.129 Firms also lead some of the more successful FOSS
projects in the world, including Google’s Android, Red Hat’s Linux
distribution, and countless others. Given these realities, it is worth
examining whether the significant transaction costs that IP rights introduce
actually serve useful purposes, and whether a public domain approach
might maintain the movements or even improve them by eliminating some
of the transaction costs and thereby allowing for accelerated innovation.
1. What Attribution?
In important respects, the IP approach to open models of innovation
fails to fulfill the roles assigned to it. For instance, with respect to
attribution-only licenses, in most cases the attribution is buried somewhere
126

See Moglen, supra note 34.
See Meeker, supra note 61, at 85 (indicating that notice requirements may serve an
important role in providing contributors with attribution in exchange for making software
freely available).
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See infra & supra.
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See, e.g., All About Linux, Cisco Is Hiring for Multiple Open Source Positions,
Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.aboutlinux.info/2007/11/cisco-is-hiring-for-multiple-open.html
(providing a list of job openings at Cisco Systems for engineers focused on contributing to
FOSS projects, primarily Linux); and Nic Williams, Eight Ways Companies Can
Contribute to Open Source Communities, Mar. 30, 2011, MASHABLE,
http://mashable.com/2011/03/30/business-open-source-communities/
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in legal documentation so that any recognition that may accompany such
attribution is minimal at best.130 This reality suggests that those who
contribute under attribution-only licenses, while perhaps motivated by some
form of recognition, in most cases are likely motivated by a different type
of recognition than what the IP approach provides. In the FOSS world, tools
such as GitHub, a widely used social coding tool, might better provide the
recognition programmers seek.131 The fact that more and more software is
contributed via GitHub without IP notices or license information at all
suggests that the “prize” of an IP notice in obscure legal documentation is
not much of a prize at all, at least to those contributing.132
Furthermore, attribution need not be connected to IP rights and,
therefore, IP remedies. The latter is what largely drives the wasteful
transaction costs that ultimately slow innovation, since the threat of IP
remedies cause firms to tread cautiously when dealing with open licensed
materials. But technological solutions to attribution could potentially
provide the same attribution—or perhaps even better provide it by
automating the attribution or making it an integral, irreplaceable part of the
work—while also removing the threat of IP remedies that only reduce the
speed of innovation by introducing the transaction costs detailed above.
Alternatives to the IP rights-based approach to attribution are discussed
more fully in Part IV below.
2. Reciprocity’s Broken Promises
With respect to reciprocity, the argument that firms’ hands are
forced, and that the content and software commons are larger due to
reciprocity, in many cases seems dubious.133 As discussed above, firms
spend significant amounts of time and resources precisely in order to avoid
results that they find inimical to their interests, including especially the
130
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many projects on Github).
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obligations of reciprocity.134 Indeed, some open licenses are so expansive in
their reciprocity requirements that firms simply ban materials licensed
under them, whereby reciprocity may, ironically, have the unintended
consequence of shrinking the commons rather than expanding them.135
Firms use and contribute to open-licensed projects when it suits their
purposes. Such purposes may have expanded over time as the benefits of
open models of innovation have proved sustainable and significant, but
firms do not appear captives of reciprocity in any sort of meaningful way.136
While firms may tread carefully in order to avoid undesired effects
of reciprocity, some might argue that the complete absence of reciprocity
would remove the key to keeping disparate parties together on an open
model of innovation. For instance, without reciprocity, firms might simply
take open-licensed projects, use them as or in a product or service, but not
share any modifications that they make to them. Indeed, this happens today
in the case of attribution-only projects such as Google’s Android or in the
world of Cloud computing, where no distribution occurs and therefore no
license requirements are triggered.
However, several reasons suggest this potential “defection” problem
is not as severe as it may seem. First, if a firm were to take and close a
project, they almost certainly would not obtain the free (to them) labor that
contributors around the world are willing to provide to open-licensed
projects. Without that free labor, firms would lose the most significant
advantages of an open model of innovation, and the free labor would likely
remain loyal to the open version of the project.137 Firms thus already have
134

See supra Part II.b.
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incentives to open and contribute as much of their materials as possible,
since doing so will attract contributors and trigger innovation in directions
that better suit the firm and its strategic direction.138
Does reciprocity prevent defections from individual contributors? It
seems unlikely that individual contributors in most cases have the time,
interest, or resources to take from a non-reciprocal project and use it as the
basis for a closed one. The literature suggests that the purposes of
individuals in contributing to open-licensed projects have little to do with
direct economic advantage; rather, their interests in contributing primarily
lie in creativity, reputation-enhancement, and indirect economic rewards.
While it does remain a possibility that individual contributors may take and
close an open-licensed project as part of their own product or service, and
thus technically defect from an open model of innovation, the same reasons
that suggest firms are unlikely to do so suggest individual contributors are
unlikely to do so as well. Individual contributors may be even less likely to
defect given their purposes in being involved in open-licensed projects in
the first place, as well as their much more limited resources to successfully
close and then maintain a project.
Some evidence even suggests that individual contributors are more
likely to contribute to open-licensed projects under an attribution-only type
of license.139 While some contributors may like the idea that anything that
they contribute can only ever be used under the terms of a reciprocal
license, the reasons discussed above for why reciprocity may not be crucial
to prevent a tragedy of the commons suggest such attitudes may be the
result of the effective marketing of reciprocity more than anything else.
In reality, IP rights and reciprocity provide no guarantee against
defections in any event. For instance, in 2007 Oracle acquired MySQL, a
database management system licensed under a reciprocal license.140
Because after the acquisition Oracle owns the IP rights in such system, it
community responding by creating a separate project).
138
For a recent example of this phenomenon playing out, see
https://www.tizen.org/about, which discusses the Tizen FOSS project. This relatively new
FOSS project has been spearheaded by, among others, Samsung and Sprint Nextel in order
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alternative software platform for smartphones and tablets.
139
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See Bryan Richard, Oracle Buys SUN; MySQL Is Forked, Apr. 20, 2009, LINUX
MAGAZINE, http://www.linux-mag.com/id/7309/.
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can at any time close access to the source code and license MySQL under a
proprietary license. Although older versions of the software would still be
available under the reciprocal license, newer versions would not be.
Similarly, any IP rights holder of an open-licensed project may at any time
change the terms under which their materials are licensed.141 While the
older versions remain under the open licenses, the rapid pace of software
innovation means that those versions quickly become obsolete. IP rights and
reciprocity, therefore, are no guarantee with respect to an open model of
innovation unless the rights holder chooses to continuously make it so.
3. Non-Reciprocal Success Stories
The successes of projects licensed under attribution-only licenses
also suggest that the fear of defection is overstated. The example of
Google’s Android is telling. Governed by the Apache 2.0 license, an
attribution-only FOSS license, anyone can take Android, significantly
modify it, and not release the source code to others.142 Amazon has done
precisely that with its version of Android for its line of tablets.143 But even
Amazon retains an interest in contributing improvements to the Google
version of Android because it will then avoid having to incorporate those
changes into every new version of Android that Google releases, and that it
subsequently uses. Contributing its changes to Android will also focus the
broader community on its path of innovation. And as discussed,
contributors will remain dedicated to the open version that Google offers.
That free (to Google) labor would almost certainly vanish once and if
Google ever decided to close off Android.144
The successes of hosted FOSS projects also suggest that the
necessity of reciprocity or attribution (in the form of IP notices) is often
overstated. In the FOSS world, hosting software is not generally considered
141
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a distribution of the software,145 and open licenses in the FOSS world
require a distribution before any reciprocity or attribution requirements
become effective. Some have ominously predicted that such Cloud
computing may well spell the death of the open license movements.146 And
yet, hosted FOSS projects have flourished and continue to do so, despite
contributors knowing that third parties that take such software and use it to
host their products and services will not be required to provide any
contributors with attribution or contribute any of their improvements back
to the project.147
Would such projects be even more successful if all third parties
hosting the software were required to provide attribution or access to their
improvements? This is the idea behind some reciprocal licenses, which
define hosting as a distribution that triggers the attribution and reciprocity
requirements.148 It is impossible to predict the outcome of such a
counterfactual, but there are reasons to doubt such an approach would lead
to greater success. And most of these reasons are the similar to the reasons
for why reciprocity in general helps little. First, it is likely that firms would
simply design around or avoid reciprocity requirements inimical to their
interests, much as they already do. Significant transaction costs without an
offsetting benefit would be the primary result. Furthermore, firms already
have incentives to contribute and make available to the open-licensed
projects as much of their innovations as possible, since doing so may focus
the broader community on their path of development for the software and
issues that the firm was unable or unwilling to resolve itself. Trying to force
firms’ hands would likely only deter their involvement if anything.149
Aside from firms, would individual contributors contribute more to
such projects if they knew other users would be required to attribute them
145
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and make their improvements available? It also seems unlikely. Again, it
seems dubious that the promise of an IP notice in an obscure attribution
compilation provides much of a lure at all. The motivations of most
individual contributors discussed above suggest that IP rights have little to
do with their participation. It is possible that some contributors have held
back from contributing to such hosted FOSS projects because of the lack of
IP attribution or reciprocity. But again, the available survey evidence
suggests that such concerns are not the primary motivations for contributors
to FOSS projects.
III.

THE MERITS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Thus far this Article has argued that relying on IP rights as part of
open models of innovation to foster innovation has had mixed results.
While open models of innovation have yielded tremendous amounts of
innovation in both the FOSS and Creative Commons worlds, the role of IP
rights in such movements has resulted in significant transactions costs for
those wishing to use and contribute innovation to such movements. And
such transaction costs slow innovation, especially in the corporate world.
While some may argue that such costs are simply the price society must pay
in order to have significant amounts of software and content available under
such permissive licensing terms, the above discussion casts doubt on the
necessity of IP rights to achieve these results.
The next section explores why a public domain approach might be a
better solution. In addition to eliminating some of the above-discussed
transaction costs, such an approach would arguably still satisfy the
motivations of most contributors to open-licensed projects, reduce the risk
of IP trolls down the road, and better align—both in theory and in
practice—with the goals of open movements.
A. A Public Domain Primer
Before assessing the merits of a public domain approach, it is
necessary to more clearly define what such an approach would entail. In the
IP world, the most common conception of the public domain means that
materials are not subject to IP rights because such rights have either expired
or been waived, or because the materials were not eligible for IP rights
protection in the first place.150 Each area of IP law—copyright, patent,
150

Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783,
791 (2006) (reviewing 13 different academic conceptions of what constitutes the “public
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trademark, and trade secret—defines what materials are eligible for
protection, how long such protection lasts, and how one obtains or
relinquishes such protection. The laws of each country may also answer
these various questions differently.
Under U.S. law, software and content showing at least a modicum of
originality automatically obtain copyright protection as soon as they are
fixed in a tangible form that is perceptible either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.151 No registration is thus required, although in the U.S. a
copyright holder must register their work in order to bring certain legal
actions relating to their work.152
Patents, conversely, do not automatically obtain upon creation of an
invention. Instead, in the U.S., one must file a patent application and satisfy
the requirements of the Patent Act—patentable subject matter, novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and disclosure—before obtaining a patent on an
invention.153 Creative Commons’ content generally would not be eligible
for patent protection, whereas software would be so long as satisfying these
requirements.154 A close cousin to patent law, trade secret law, generally
protects information that derives independent economic value from not
being known or readily ascertainable, and which is the subject of reasonable
efforts to maintain its secrecy.155 Often firms choose between patent and
trade secret protection for a particular invention.156
Last, trademark law in certain cases grants a party the right to use a
mark as an indicator of the source of goods or services and to prevent others
from using the same mark in connection with similar goods and services.157
One of trademark law’s primary purposes is, therefore, to protect consumers
from confusion about the source of a good in the marketplace.158 Generally
151

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
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firms register a mark under the federal Lanham Act in order to obtain
nationwide trademark protection,159 although state common law can also
provide firms with trademark rights based on actual usage of such marks.160
A public domain approach, therefore, would need to effectively
override any automatic copyright rights, waive any patent rights (both with
respect to any patent rights already obtained as well as prospectively), and
relinquish any remedies that come with either. Trade secret rights, if any,
would be relinquished as soon as the rights holder released the software or
content to the public. Arguably waiving any trademark rights is not only
unnecessary but inadvisable, since others could then use the marks to
confuse consumers as to the source of the software or content. Indeed, this
is precisely why Creative Commons, which includes a public domain
dedication tool in its repertoire of legal documents, expressly exempts
trademark rights in the tool.161
How to waive copyright and patent rights is not a straightforward
matter, however.162 Part IV of this Article explores some of the difficulties
in dedicating materials to the public domain and the merits of a “Public
Domain Act” intended to supplement the various IP Acts in the U.S. by
more clearly charting out a path to dedicating materials to the public
domain. But before turning to that task, the case for a public domain
approach in the FOSS, Creative Commons, and other open movements must
be made more fully.
B. Transaction Costs Redux
A public domain approach in open movements would not mean that
transaction costs would disappear entirely. Most firms, for instance, would
still likely vet public domain materials on intake for several reasons. For
example, someone without the rights to do so may have purported to place
materials in the public domain, and thus firms would likely want to review
159
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materials to determine if the public domain designation passes legal muster.
Furthermore, public domain materials still suffer from the issue of not
having the backing of a third party that can provide the user with
indemnities and warranties. Although this is an issue with open-licensed
materials today, a public domain approach would do nothing to address it.
Consequently, firms may still incur transaction costs in vetting such public
domain materials on intake.
Furthermore, in the M&A context acquirors would still likely want
to know what materials at the target company are in the public domain, how
they got there, and whether such designation affects the value of their
proposed acquisition. Such issues would almost certainly affect agreement
negotiations. M&A due diligence and the costs thereof, therefore, would
also not simply go away.
Some internal management costs would also certainly survive. Firms
may generally want to know the source of third-party materials used at the
firm, and so may still incur costs in managing and tracking public domain
materials and, potentially, keeping them segregated from other materials.
And firms may still develop and provide training about their internal
policies for using and contributing to the public domain.
Firms would also continue to incur some outbound costs if a public
domain approach replaced an IP-licensing approach. Firms may want to
disclaim liability and indemnities for such materials, for instance, in both
the end user and commercial agreement context. In the end user context
standard disclaimers that firms already include in their end user agreements
would likely address this concern. But in commercial negotiations,
obtaining such a disclaimer could be difficult in many contexts and
therefore result in some transaction costs to the firm.
Firms would also continue to incur costs when contributing to
projects adopting a public domain approach. They would still, for instance,
in many cases desire to conduct outbound reviews to ensure that no
copyright or patent rights were in jeopardy contrary to the interests or
policies of the firm.
Despite these remaining costs, however, a public domain approach,
if done right, promises to significantly reduce such costs. On intake, for
instance, firms would not need to deal with the hundreds of different types
of open licenses that are currently used. Many have cited license
proliferation as a major problem,163 including significant concerns about
whether and to what extent licenses may successfully coexist.164 A
163

See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Open Source License Proliferation: Helpful
Diversity or Hopeful Confusion, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261 (discussing the pros and
cons of license proliferation in general).
164
Id. at 80-1. See also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism
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straightforward public domain designation would allow firms to make faster
decisions on whether the materials may be used or not.
In the M&A context, transaction costs would almost certainly be
reduced as well. For instance, the acquiring firm would not need to concern
itself with license compliance and compatibility issues, whether in the past
or going forward. It may still require audits in order to better understand the
assets it is acquiring, but the public domain materials would not come with
the issues of potential IP remedies or reciprocity. Some issues around the
validity of such materials being in the public domain at all may still arise,
but no more so than in the open-license context currently.
Internal management costs would also certainly decline. While firms
may still incur some costs in segregating and tracking public domain
materials, as well as developing and administering their policies on use of
public domain materials, they would not need to worry about the
requirements of reciprocity, attribution, and license compatibility as in the
open-license context. Such management would, therefore, be done for
internal efficiency reasons rather than legal ones. This is a positive result in
terms of innovation since such tracking focuses on improving products and
services rather than helping ensure compliance with a set of rules, which
compliance is often undertaken simply to avoid the effect of such rules
(e.g., reciprocity or IP remedies).
Outbound costs would diminish as well. Firms would not need to
spend the significant amounts of time they currently do building licensecompliant attribution documents and source code repositories. They would
also avoid the costs of designing around the effects of reciprocity and
license incompatibilities and conducting outbound audits to ensure that the
effects of reciprocity are contained in accordance with firm policies.
Although some outbound audits may still be done, they would almost
certainly not be as significant given the absence of reciprocity and licensing
requirements in general.
Negotiations with third parties in commercial agreements would
also see more efficient results. Although third parties may still want to
know about public domain materials included in product or service, and
such concerns may affect negotiations, the potential effects of reciprocity
and IP remedies are typically the most pressing concern of the parties. A
public domain approach would remove this concern and therefore improve
the efficiency of such negotiations.

in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 634-5 (2010) (discussing the significant costs that
may result when attempting to reconcile the various conflicting terms of the numerously
available and used open licenses); and Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes,
96 GEO. L.J. 885, 943-4 (2008).
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C. Containing the Prospect of Trolls
Another significant benefit of a public domain approach would be to
limit the likelihood of IP “trolls.” As discussed, rent-seeking or even the
traditional economic incentives of IP rights are not generally what motivate
individuals and firms to contribute to open-licensed projects.165 The limited
amount and nature of case law surrounding open-licensed materials, despite
evidence suggesting significant license non-compliance, provides some
confirmation to this.166 Indeed, the primary motivation behind the suits that
have been brought seems to be simply a desire to have the violators follow
the relevant license requirements.167
But this benevolent behavior could change. This possibility seems
especially stark in the case of copyright. The recent example of Righthaven,
the now defunct copyright “troll” responsible for filing numerous cases on
behalf of its clients against users of its clients’ copyrighted materials,
illustrates this possibility.168 So long as open-licensed materials remain
subject to copyright, similar suits are possible in the open license world.
While it is perhaps unlikely that such suits will materialize so long
as the materials remain in the possession of the original rights holders, a
dour economy and the counsel of a copyright troll might change the status
quo. Furthermore, bankruptcies and other acts of insolvency could release
such copyrighted materials into the hands of owners lacking the benign
mindset of many contributors to open-licensed projects.169 Because
statutory damages and injunctive relief are available for violations of
copyright in the U.S.,170 obtaining rents might be especially tempting since
such potential liabilities make obtaining settlement payments that much
easier.171
Such rent-seeking seems to have little to do with innovation.
Instead, it hampers it. In the patent space, commentary regarding the
165

See supra Part I.b.
Id.
167
Id.
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See generally Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2011: Copyright and Trade Secret
Cases, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 331 (2012) (describing the Righthaven litigation).
169
See Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 673, 691 (2012) (discussing how patent trolls often acquire patents in
bankruptcy proceedings).
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17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
171
See Constance Boutsikaris, The Rise of Copyright Trolls in a Digital Information
Economy: New Litigation Business Strategies and Their Impact on Innovation, 20
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 391 (2012) (discussing the business strategy of Righthaven in
threatening significant statutory damages for what in some instances turned out to be “fair
use” under copyright law, while offering to accept a significantly lower amount as
settlement of the claims).
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negative effects of patent trolls on innovation has been significant.172 While
such troll-like behavior in the copyright space has not been widespread, it is
better to ensure that it remains so. A public domain approach to open
models of innovation would help do precisely that.
The prospect of patent trolls buying up patented open-licensed
materials and wielding the patents against FOSS users may be less
worrisome.173 In most cases it is unlikely that FOSS projects have obtained
patents for a number of reasons.174 Many of the projects are run by a
collection of individual contributors across the world. Filing for and
obtaining patents is costly,175 and such collectives of individuals in most
cases are unlikely to have undertaken such activity due to the costs,176
172

See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property:
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007) (discussing the
excessive power patent trolls may hold over complex products through ownership of a
patent covering a single component in such complex product); Gerard N. MaglioCreative
Commonsa, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809 (2007) (discussing several possible means by which to prevent
troll-like behavior); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 613-4 (2008) (labeling the patent troll problem as a
form of “patent hold-up” because such trolls extort more value from third parties than their
patent is actually worth); Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 Stan.
Tech L. Rev. 1 (2012) (discussing a new form of behavior somewhat akin to troll-like
behavior, what they call “mass aggregators” of patents, which behavior, while possibly
resulting in some benefits, also has the effect of potentially slowing innovation); Colleen
V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, Sept. 28, 2012, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146251 (discussing the negative
effects of patent troll activity on startup companies); and Simon Phipps, Numbers Don’t
Lie:
Patent
Trolls
Are
a
Plague,
Oct.
19,
2012,
INFOWORLD,
http://www.infoworld.com/d/open-source-software/numbers-dont-lie-patent-trolls-areplague-205192 (discussing the ill effects of patent trolls on innovation) .
173
Of course, the prospect of patent trolls using other patents against open-licensed
projects remains real, but that subject is beyond the scope of this Article.
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See generally Ronald J. Mann, supra note 48, at 2-3 (discussing reasons why FOSS
developers generally do not obtain patents, but why, given the environment in which they
exist, they may need to in order to survive); Schultz & Urban, supra note 20, 10-14
(discussing the cultural and political reasons why open license communities do not
generally patent their technologies).
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See, e.g., Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, Jan. 28, 2011,
IPWatchdog,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/01/28/the-cost-of-obtainingpatent/id=14668/ (providing a range of estimates, starting at $5,000 and ending at $15,000
or more); and Michael Neustel, How Much Does a Patent Cost?, Neustel Law Offices,
http://www.patent-ideas.com/Patent-Costs-Fees/How-Much-Does-A-Patent-Cost.aspx (last
visited Nov. 2, 2012) (providing similar ranges).
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See Simon Phipps, Why Software Patents Are Evil, Mar. 16, 2012, INFOWORLD,
http://www.infoworld.com/d/open-source-software/why-software-patents-are-evil188738?page=0,2 (indicating that FOSS communities often lack the resources to mount a
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especially since their motivations in contributing have little to do with IP
rights or obtaining direct economic remuneration.177 The unlikelihood of
patents for FOSS projects increases given that many FOSS licenses include
automatic patent licenses to downstream users.178 So the reward of
obtaining patents on the technology—being able to exclude others from
using such technology absent a patent license—in many cases by default
has already been given away.179
Furthermore, even in cases where the rights holders do find reasons
to file for patents—for instance, as a defensive mechanism vis-à-vis
aggressive third parties—such realization in many cases may simply come
too late. For instance, under U.S. law a creator has one year from releasing
or using materials in public to file a patent on the technology.180 After that
time period, any possible patent rights expire.181 The collective nature of
many FOSS projects, and the non-IP centric motivations of such groups,
makes it likely that this alone would prevent many from filing for patents or
being eligible to do so. In cases of well-organized, corporate open-licensed
projects—for instance, Red Hat’s version of Linux—firms may in fact
pursue patents on the open-licensed technology, although reluctantly in
most cases given the general hostility to software patents in FOSS
communities.182
Even if the risk of patent trolls is limited, a public domain approach
that effectively waives patent rights could still help guard against that risk.
Of course, users of such materials would remain vulnerable to suits from
trolls that have obtained patents that read on the dedicated materials, but
that is a result of the current U.S. patent system rather than an issue with a
177

Indeed, some in the FOSS world view software patents as evil and thus eschew
software patents as a matter of principle. See, e.g., Julie Bort, The Defensive Patent License
Makes Patents Less Evil for Open Source, May 7, 2010, NetworkWorld,
http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/defensive-patent-license-makes-patentsless-e (indicating that FOSS developers “notoriously shy away from pursuing software
patents [because] [t]he concept is ugly to them”).
178
Christian H. Nadan, Closing the Loophole: Open Source Licensing and the Implied
Patent License, 26 The Computer & Internet Lawyer, Aug. 2009, available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/46088081/Closing-the-Loophole-Open-Source-Licensing-ampthe-Implied-Patent-License-Nadan (indicating that some FOSS licenses include express
patent licenses, while the others may contain implied patent licenses).
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Id.
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(indicating that this “statutory bar” to obtaining a patent remains in effect following
enactment of the America Invents Act of 2011).
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the firm intends to pursue software patents, despite being opposed to them in principle, in
order to help defend FOSS against IP trolls and other aggressive patent holders).

2/19/2013 6:39 PM]

A Case for the Public Domain

public domain approach. Much like the open license approach, a public
domain approach could help limit the number of potential patents reading
on the dedicated materials by expanding the prior art.183 And, a public
domain approach, if implemented right, could better limit the number of
patents that might be asserted against such materials (since, for instance, not
all FOSS licenses include express patent licenses). Section IV below
discusses how a public domain approach might best be implemented in
order to address patent issues. So long as materials remain subject to IP
rights, however, the prospect of trolls, in the patent world but especially in
the case of copyright, remains more likely.
D. Satisfying Contributors
A possibly fatal counterargument to the public domain approach is
simply this: if contributors preferred such an approach, they could have
already adopted it. But they largely have not. Instead, in the FOSS world,
the most popular license remains the General Public License, a reciprocal
license.184 Large numbers of developers also prefer the Apache License for
their FOSS projects, an attribution-only license.185 In the Creative
Commons world, some evidence suggests that participants prefer more
restrictive Creative Commons licenses.186 One might infer from this
evidence that whatever the issues with the IP approach, contributors prefer
it.
But there are reasons to doubt this inference. In the FOSS world, for
instance, there is no recognized or widely used public domain dedication
tool.187 Instead, the Open Source Initiative and the Free Software
183

For challenges that open license communities face in expanding the prior art
through contributions of technology under open licenses, see Schultz & Urban, supra note
20, at 22.
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See, e.g., Black Duck Software, Open Source License Data, OPEN SOURCE
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of 100M Creative Commons-Licensed Images on Flickr, CreativeCommons.org, Mar. 25,
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Foundation—the two leading FOSS advocacy organizations in the world—
vet and approve open licenses for use in the community.188 While it is true
that various projects could simply ignore these recommended licenses and
adopt a public domain approach—and some have attempted to do precisely
that189—that sentiment assumes that the organizers of such projects
understand how to do so. Section IV below, which discusses the
complexities involved in dedicating materials to the public domain and
some possible changes in the law that may help make doing so easier,
suggests dedicating materials to the public domain is not a straightforward
matter.
The open licenses in the FOSS world and the Creative Commons
licenses in the Creative Commons world, conversely, provide contributors
with vetted and well-known legal tools for making materials available to the
public. Indeed, in some cases contributors believe that using such open
licenses in fact does contribute their materials to the public domain.190
Given the availability of these licenses, the significant roles of the licensing
bodies in creating and advancing the open license movements, and the
complexities in dedicating materials to the public domain, it is no surprise,
then, that more projects have not adopted a public domain approach.
In the Creative Commons world, a public domain dedication tool
does exist, and yet most open-licensed materials in the Creative Commons
world appear to be licensed under non-public domain, copyright licenses.191
Part of the reason for this may lie simply in the belief that reciprocity helps
build up the commons by ensuring that others license their improvements or
derivative works similarly.192 However, as argued throughout, there are
domain. See, e.g., Unlicense Yourself: Set Your Code Free, http://unlicense.org/ (last
visited Nov. 2, 2012).
188
See Asay, supra note 36, at 268-71 (summarizing the two organizations roles in
promoting FOSS and approving FOSS licenses based on each group’s definition of FOSS).
189
See supra note 187 (providing a list of projects that have taken the public domain
approach to FOSS).
190
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reasons to doubt that reciprocity in fact has that effect, at least where
subsequent users do not already desire such a result. Instead, it can and
often does deter third parties from using the materials due to concerns about
the reach of reciprocity. Or, in the FOSS world, they simply design around
the effects of reciprocity in many cases.
Nonetheless, attribution may still provide a reason to maintain an IP
approach to open models of innovation. Contributors to open-licensed
projects often suggest that the “signaling effects” and reputational benefits
they receive from their contributions are significant drivers in why they
contribute in the first place.193 But an IP approach is not the only way, or
even the best way, to satisfy such goals. In the FOSS world, as discussed, it
is hard to imagine that the typical attribution provides the type of
recognition that contributors rely on as a motivation, since such attributions
are generally buried in the product or service documentation, where no one
but lawyers sees them. Instead, tools such as Github likely represent a more
powerful means of providing recognition.194
Furthermore, even if some inventors and creators do wish for a
formal attribution in materials that make use of their works, an IP notice
solution seems like a suboptimal one. Technological solutions to attribution
could potentially provide the same attribution—or perhaps even better
provide it by automating the attribution or making it an integral part of the
work—while also removing the threat of IP remedies that only reduce the
speed of innovation by introducing the transaction costs detailed above.
Even absent a formal legal requirement for attribution, community
norms could also help dictate such a result. In the Creative Commons’ FAQ
regarding the public domain, for instance, the organization notes that while
the public domain dedication tool does not require that subsequent users
provide any sort of attribution to the original author, community norms
(such as with scientific or academic citations) may still strongly encourage
such attributions.195 Such norms could serve the same role in a public
domain approach.
E. Reconciling a Vision

ones-arent/ (suggesting that share-alike in the Creative Commons world may help build up
the commons by promoting contributions back into it).
193
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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[Opinion], MAKEUSEOF, Feb. 24, 2012, http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/contributeopensource-projects/ (discussing the advantages of an active Github profile, including
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and generating significant numbers of followers).
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Richard Stallman, considered by some as the “prophet” or
“philosopher king” of the FOSS movement,196 has written a series of essays
powerfully arguing against IP rights in software. For instance, in an essay
titled, “Why Software Should Not Have Owners,” he provocatively writes
that “’[c]ontrol over the use of one’s ideas’ really constitutes control over
other people’s lives; and it is usually used to make their lives more
difficult.”197 Consequently, from Stallman’s point of view, as an ethical
matter “a person should not [enforce copyrights] regardless of whether the
law enables him to” because doing so harms society as a whole.198
In a related essay, “Why Software Should Be Free,” Stallman argues
against ownership rights in software because rights owners often impose
restrictions on the software’s use, and such restrictions “only interfere [with
use of the software]….[s]o the effect can only be negative.”199 Such
obstructions result in fewer people using, adapting, and fixing the software,
and therefore fewer people benefiting from it.200 In essence, Stallman argues
against IP rights in software because these rights lead to a tragedy of the
anti-commons.
Naturally Stallman does not have his own IP approach in mind when
discussing this anti-commons issue. Instead, he is focused on software
licensing models that prohibit access to source code and charge licensing
fees for use of the software. But reciprocity and the other effects of
employing IP rights on behalf of openness and freedom have similar
obstructive effects on use, adaptation, and adoption, as discussed above.201
Stallman himself later admits that the particular mode of restricting sharing
is irrelevant. As he puts it: “how…obstruction is carried out…doesn’t affect
the conclusion…if it succeeds in preventing use, it does harm.”202
Nonetheless, though the IP approach may be a suboptimal one, the
architects of open movements argue that it is a necessary evil. Without it,
defectors would quickly deplete the commons, resulting in a tragedy of the
commons. Reciprocity, according to this argument, prevents such a tragedy
by rendering concerns about the long-term viability of open-licensed
projects moot because reciprocity assures users that the project will remain
open and available.203 Therefore, they will continue to participate in and
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contribute to the commons.204 Eben Moglen cites the reciprocity-based IP
approach as the “central institutional structure” responsible for the FOSS
movement’s success and the GPL, the Free Software Foundation’s primary
reciprocal license, as Stallman’s greatest achievement.205
These arguments prove unconvincing. Part II.c above provided
arguments as to why the IP-induced anti-commons are not a necessary evil
in order to prevent a tragedy of the commons. Furthermore, it is also worth
noting that a tragedy of the commons in the true sense of the phrase simply
never results absent reciprocity. For instance, if software or content is in the
public domain, subsequent users are not then able to “subtract” from the
commons because each person’s use of the software or content is
“nonrivalrous.” Hence, though subsequent users of public domain materials
may not contribute changes to the commons, and thereby fail to expand the
commons, their “defections” would not remove materials from the
commons. The size of the commons would simply remain the same.206
But is reciprocity responsible for the existence of the commons at
all? Put another way, even if reciprocity does not prevent a true tragedy of
the commons, would the commons simply not exist, or stop growing after a
few initial contributions, without reciprocity? Such a result might be viewed
as a form of depleting the commons, and thus a form of a tragedy of the
commons. In the FOSS world, for instance, reciprocity seems to have
played a role in promoting Linux as a counterweight to Microsoft’s
operating system, at least early on.207 At least some developers may have
been motivated by the understanding that, because of Linux’s reciprocity
requirement, corporate competitors to Microsoft could not simply take their
hard work and close it back up. This factor may have been especially
critical early on in the FOSS movement, when developer communities were
less interconnected and thus less capable of collaborating in order to
compete against such potential defectors.208
But reciprocity’s time has come and gone. If Linux were in the
public domain or under an attribution-only license, for instance, and firms
used it without releasing their changes in source code form, this would in no
way impinge upon others’ rights to use the public domain or attributiononly version. And that version would certainly continue to attract
contributions, both from independent developers and firms, for the variety
204
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of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations discussed above.209 The firm that took
without giving back would be relegated to hoarding its own version in a
technical corner, hoping that future developments advance in a direction
favorable to the firm. It would not, however, be able to attract developers to
its own version except by hiring them. Forking software projects and then
closing them, therefore, in some ways is its own punishment.210
Put another way: peer production models of innovation have built-in
mechanisms that reinforce contributing to the commons rather than trying to
hoard pieces of it, and such built-in mechanisms have nothing to do with IP
rights. Firms that attempt to hoard pieces of the commons effectively cannot
because the goods are nonrivalrous, and when they attempt to do so, they
simply cut themselves off from free (to them) labor—at least with respect to
changes that they make to their hoarded version—and in some cases
influencing the direction of the project. They lose the very benefits of an
open model of innovation. These benefits may not have been clear to firms
in the beginning, when reciprocity may have played a bigger role in
advancing this alternative model of innovation, but they seem clear now.
As discussed above, the successes of attribution-only licensed
projects and hosted FOSS projects also provide real-world evidence
suggesting that reciprocity is less of a driving force behind creating the
commons than often claimed, at least today.211 As also discussed, it is also
doubtful that reciprocity frequently forces firms’ hands. Instead, firms
contribute when it makes strategic sense for them, but otherwise simply
design around or avoid certain reciprocal licenses altogether.212
Ironically, much of this seemed clear to the architects of the open
license IP approach from the beginning. Eben Moglen, in critiquing IP
regimes as applied to software, decries the “econodwarf” perspective that IP
rights are necessary in order to provide creators with incentives to create.213
Instead, he claims that the Internet helps connect people, who then engage
each other in creative activities for their own pleasure “and to conquer their
uneasy sense of being too alone.”214 The desire to engage in creative
activity and share that experience with others, in Moglen’s view, is the
driving force behind the FOSS movement.215 Stallman comes to similar
209
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conclusions.216 And surveys of participants in open license movements
confirm that such goals play a significant role in motivating many of them
to participate.217
Moglen goes on to argue that the “field strength” of the IP system is
the primary obstruction to such creativity growing exponentially.218
Stallman expresses similar sentiments,219 although of course both are
focused on the traditional IP approach, rather than their own. But as
discussed above, their IP approach results in many of the same issues that
they identify with the traditional IP approach: a version of the tragedy of the
anti-commons. And, as this Article argues, all for naught.
To some extent it is unsurprising that the architects of the open
license movements adopted an IP approach despite the normative
framework they laid out for why non-IP models of innovation are superior
and sustainable. In the FOSS context, for instance, Stallman had
experienced firsthand how proprietary firms had grown over software
products, and how such restrictive approaches to software ownership
prevented engineers from improving software.220 Expecting Stallman and
other early leaders in the FOSS movement to trust firms to accept their
normative arguments, when firms had in fact rejected them, is therefore
dubious. Instead, Stallman and others responded to firms with a dose of
their own medicine, with a twist: an IP license—the General Public
License—that commanded adherence to their normative precepts.221
But again, this IP strategy, while understandable in context, belies
the normative vision offered by Stallman and others and slows innovation
unnecessarily. And as this Article has argued, this anticommons is not a
necessary evil to prevent a greater tragedy of the commons, at least
anymore. Moglen was right—many people do seem to be motivated by
creativity and the ability to share it with others. Direct economic rewards
are not the only end for which people and firms will work. And IP rights
often simply get in the way, as Stallman argued.
Realigning the normative visions of open movements with the actual
mechanics of such movements would, therefore, prove beneficial. But such
benefits are more than simply spurring innovation by reducing the
transaction costs discussed above. Adopting a truly public domain approach
to open development would better foster norms of free and open access than
the current IP approach does. Put simply: such an approach would more
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ably push back against the very idea of IP rights in software and other types
of content.
For instance, the more that software and content is available in the
public domain, the more difficult it becomes for firms or others to appear
credible in asserting strong IP rights over it, whatever the law on the books
may be. The FOSS and Creative Commons movements have already helped
create some of this type of pressure in the software and content worlds. For
instance, one reason that firms are careful to comply with open licenses, and
one reason that they often choose open-licensed solutions in the first place,
is to foster goodwill and strengthen relationships with developer
communities.222 Firms often seek to be viewed as good actors in the open
license movements because their products and services’ commercial
viability often depend on good relations with developer communities.223
But the FOSS, Creative Commons, and related movements could go
farther by eliminating IP rights altogether and thereby removing the
conflicts between the normative visions of such movements and their actual
implementation. Put another way, if a societal consensus develops that
software and other types of content should not be subject to IP rights, then,
notwithstanding the law on the books, others will be more likely to adhere
to this consensus. And, the law is more likely to change accordingly over
time, too, to reflect this consensus.
The current disconnect between the normative vision of FOSS and
other open license movements and the actual implementation has the
opposite effect. Regardless of the titles of Stallman’s provocative essays,
his reliance on IP rights to further his vision of free access undermines it in
important ways by tacitly arguing that IP rights are necessary to foster
innovation. Indeed, that is, in a nutshell, essentially the argument in favor of
reciprocity. By failing to trust the convincing power of his normative tenets,
therefore, he and others have failed to push back against IP rights in the
software and content worlds as powerfully as they could have. As a result,
the FOSS and other open license movements concede a foundation that
inherently conflicts with their vision of innovation. And that conflict leads
to an unnecessary anticommons that slows innovation.
One practical negative result of this tension is increasingly
complicated efforts to push back against the very foundation such
222
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movements have conceded. For instance, Stallman and the Free Software
Foundation extensively revised the General Public License in 2008 after
years of public input.224 The new version was meant to address perceived
new threats to the FOSS movement—primarily the use of digital rights
management to thwart free access to software and increasingly sophisticated
patent deals.225 But the complexity of the new version has resulted in slower
than expected adoption,226 increased transaction costs in dealing with the
license’s complexities, and some firms’ prohibition of materials licensed
under the new version altogether.227 As new technological “threats” to the
preferences of Stallman and others develop, similarly complicated license
revisions may ensue in order to address them.228 Rather than promoting
innovation, however, such efforts simply introduce significant transaction
costs without appearing to achieve the desired result: that is, greater
freedom of use. A true public domain approach would achieve that result.
IV.

MAKING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN PUBLIC

This Article has thus far offered reasons to doubt that IP rights are
the best method by which to promote open models of innovation. An IP
approach results in a tragedy of the anticommons, while failing to prevent a
tragedy of the commons in a meaningful way. Those that choose open
models of innovation do so for a variety of extrinsic and intrinsic reasons
that generally have little if anything to do with IP rights, and a public
domain approach would do nothing to undermine such reasons for
participation. A public domain approach, therefore, would encourage at
least similar levels of participation in open models of innovation and, in
fact, would likely lead to greater participation by eliminating significant
transaction costs. A public domain approach would also eliminate future
transaction costs stemming from rent-seeking by IP trolls, as well as
aligning the normative roots of such movements with their actual
mechanics. In addition to helping reduce wasteful transaction costs, such
realignment would better serve the purpose of pushing back against
expansive IP rights in the software and content worlds.
The question remains, however, how to best promote a public
domain approach. Materials can qualify for the public domain in two
224
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general ways. The first is through private action: right holders or potential
rights holders may dedicate such materials to the public domain, despite
whatever IP rights they may have in such materials.229 Individuals or firms
can do so through tools such as that provided by the Creative Commons230
or by simply forfeiting patent rights, for instance, by using an invention
publicly and failing to file for patent rights in the permitted grace period.
The other method consists in government action—that is, the
government can either exempt certain categories of materials from IP rights
or limit the time period for which IP rights subsist in the materials, after
which time period the materials enter the public domain. The public domain
can be expanded, therefore, by the government expanding the categories of
materials that are not subject to IP rights or limiting the time periods for
which IP rights subsist in the materials. In the U.S. and elsewhere, however,
governments and courts have recently shrunk the public domain by
expanding the categories of materials that are subject to IP rights231 and
increasing the time periods for which IP rights subsist in such materials.232
Private action, therefore, may appear to be the more likely route
towards expanding the public domain. But using private tools to dedicate
materials to the public domain is fraught with certain complexities
discussed below. Government action could, therefore, buttress private
action by simplifying the method by which parties contribute materials to
the public domain. A Public Domain Act would thus be a welcome and
needed addition to the IP statutory regime in the U.S.233 The following
sections first examine the current state of private tools used to dedicate
materials to the public domain and some of the issues that arise in that
context, followed by what a Public Domain Act might look like in order to
address such issues.
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A. Private Action Unadulterated

As discussed above, effectively placing materials in the public
domain in the U.S. through private action would ideally require
relinquishing any applicable copyright and patent rights (and all related
rights). Waiving trademark rights is inadvisable since doing so may result in
significant consumer confusion. Any trade secret rights would cease to exist
as soon as the materials were made public.234
The options for achieving this result, however, are rather weak. For
instance, the Creative Commons public domain legal tool—perhaps the best
example of a private tool used to dedicate materials to the public domain—
expressly exempts patent rights from the public domain dedication because
of the “complexities associated with patent rights.”235 Avoiding patent
rights in the tool may come with good reason. For one, the Creative
Commons licenses are generally intended for content that is not normally
patentable subject matter. Furthermore, patent rights are unlike copyright in
at least one important respect: whereas copyrights obtain automatically so
long as some modicum of originality is fixed in a tangible medium, patent
rights must be applied for and granted through a long prosecution process.
Consequently, questions naturally arise regarding how to effectively waive
rights that one may or may not ever seek or obtain.
Other complexities also arise due to the nature of patent rights
themselves. Would the patent waiver only be with respect to the dedicated
work or in general? Would the waiver be structured as a covenant not to
sue? If so, what would the scope of such a covenant be? Such additional
complexities likely played a role in steering the Creative Commons away
from addressing patent rights, especially given that most content subject to
Creative Commons licenses would be ineligible for patent protection in any
event. However, while such an exemption may be palatable in the world of
content, in the software world and others patent rights cause significant
234
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transactions costs and are a significant concern. Waiving them as part of a
public domain dedication is therefore desirable in order create a commons
that is free of IP entanglements and the resulting transaction costs.
Specific statutory IP doctrines, furthermore, may prevent private
public domain waivers such as the Creative Commons tool from being fully
effective. In the copyright sphere, for instance, U.S. federal law allows
copyright holders and their heirs to terminate any transfer or license of
copyright interests during certain defined periods.236 This doctrine, by
providing copyright holders with a means of recovery in the event that
powerful third parties at some point coerced them into an unprofitable
bargain, has the perverse effect of possibly preventing effective public
domain dedications.237 Some commentators have consequently called for
legislation and other proposals to address this and related issues.238
Aside from specific patent and copyright obstacles in dedicating
materials to the public domain, significant amounts of conflicting
information regarding what the public domain is, what it entails, and how to
dedicate materials to it also exists. Perhaps most obviously, both the FOSS
and Creative Commons movements include so many different licenses as to
make it difficult for creators to know what the right path to the public
domain is.239 In fact, often creators mistakenly believe that open licenses are
in essence public domain dedications.240 The Creative Commons, FSF, and
OSI all provide significant amounts of commentary explaining the various
license options.241 But such commentaries, together with complex license
texts themselves, leave much to sift through when the goal may often be
quite simple. Furthermore, such movements’ dogged determination to
maintain an IP approach, despite such an approach largely failing to achieve
its stated purposes, as discussed above, also serves to obscure the path to the
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public domain by convincing creators that IP rights and reciprocity, for
instance, are crucial.
A Public Domain Act could help address some of these issues by
providing a straightforward means by which to contribute materials to the
public domain. The next section examines how this might work.
B. A Public Domain Act
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”242 The U.S. Constitution, therefore, expressly
adopts the principle that granting authors and inventors IP rights in their
works is important to spurring creative activity and authorizes Congress to
act accordingly.
But what the open license movements discussed in this Article seem
to confirm is that IP rights are not the only way to incent such creative
activity, and that inventors and authors also contribute significant creative
activity for a variety of other reasons, in many cases in spite of IP rights.
This is not to argue that IP rights should be done away, or that they do not
in many cases function as an important incentive to creative and inventive
activity. They clearly do. But it is to say that another path to promoting “the
Progress of Science and useful Arts” lies in unlocking the potential of the
public domain.
1. A Public Domain Symbol
A public domain Act could help do so by creating a universal
symbol for when materials are in the public domain. For instance, much like
the “(C)” symbol that signifies something is subject to copyright, a “(PD)”
symbol could be adopted to indicate that materials are free of copyright and
patent claims, at least from those dedicating such materials. Rather than
having to rely on third-party licenses that approximate such intentions, or
come up with some public domain declaration of their own, therefore,
creators could use such a symbol as a simple means to achieve public
domain status.
A (PD) symbol could also serve the important role of providing
creators and inventors with attribution. For instance, if a creator or inventor
decided to include their name with the (PD) symbol, the Public Domain Act
could mandate that subsequent users are not permitted to remove such
242
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designation. In the FOSS context, this requirement would not require
compiling attribution documents or making public domain source code
available to additional downstream users. It would simply mean that users
of public domain materials should leave the “(PD) 2012 John Doe”
designation intact. The Public Domain Act might provide for some limited
statutory damages to help ensure that users take this requirement seriously.
In order to deter parties from wrongfully placing materials in the
public domain through use of the (PD) symbol, the Public Domain Act
might also make available statutory damages against those that place
materials in the public domain with actual knowledge or reason to know
that they do not have the rights to do so. Such a provision would be an
important safeguard against the Public Domain Act being exploited and the
(PD) symbol thereby losing credibility. Relatedly, the Act might provide
some sort of copyright infringement safe harbor for users of public domaindesignated materials that rely on such designation in good faith.
2. A Limited Patent Waiver
Ideally a Public Domain Act would by default limit the patent rights
being waived to the specific materials containing the “(PD)” designation.
This seems logical from the perspective of both the dedicator and
subsequent user. The contributor would likely only wish to dedicate the
materials to which she attaches the (PD) designation, and so would not
expect such dedication to extend to other materials that she has not similarly
dedicated. Such a default limitation would thus better encourage
contributions to the public domain. The subsequent user would similarly
gain a windfall if the patent rights waived extended beyond the actual
materials they were receiving. Of course, if patent holders wished to
dedicate a patent in its entirety to the public domain, then the Public
Domain Act would ideally provide for a means to do that as well. How the
exact language should appear is beyond the scope of this Article, but the
general concept of a limited patent waiver would be an important piece of
such a Public Domain Act.
Ideally such a waiver would also function as a bar to obtaining
patent rights related to such materials. That is, if a dedicator does not
already have patents reading on the dedicated materials, such dedication
would mean that the materials are now prior art that would prevent both the
dedicator and any other party from obtaining a patent that reads on such
materials. Ideally, then, no grace period under patent law would be
applicable for applying for patent rights once released into the public
domain under the “(PD)” designation.
If the dedicator already does have patents that read on the dedicated
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materials (or has filed for a patent that is ultimately issued), such a patent
waiver should be more than simply a covenant not to sue from the original
dedicator. Courts have at times found that covenants not to sue do not
automatically bind future patent owners. So, for instance, if a third party
dedicated some materials to the public domain but owned patents reading
on such materials, and the Public Domain Act failed to make clear that any
subsequent owner of such patents was also bound by the dedication with
respect to those materials, the new owner might reasonably expect to be
able to bring a patent action against users of such materials. The Public
Domain Act would therefore need to clearly address this issue in favor of
the public domain-dedicated materials and users thereof as well as potential
issues relating to patent exhaustion, where similar issues might arise.243
One potential drawback to the public domain approach advocated in
this Article compared to the open license IP approach is that many FOSS
licenses, for instance, also include patent licenses from subsequent users.
So, theoretically at least, patent protection is broader in the open license
context because subsequent distributors of open-licensed materials also
grant patent rights to additional downstream users. In the public domain
approach, conversely, the patent protection comes only from the person or
entity that dedicates the materials to the public domain (as well as those that
might obtain that original dedicator’s relevant patents). A subsequent user
of such public domain materials with a patent that reads on them could take
and use the materials, distribute them to third parties, and then require those
third parties to take a patent license or face a patent infringement suit.
There are reasons to doubt that patent protection in the open license
context is in reality any broader than it would be under a public domain
approach, however. As discussed above, firms go to significant lengths to
ensure that their patent and other economic interests are not compromised
through use of open-licensed materials. Consequently, while in the open
license context there may be an appearance of significant patent protection
from firms because of the presence of patent licenses in the open licenses,
in reality the actual patent protection from firms is likely much narrower
than imagined (i.e., due to the extensive measures that firms take to protect
their patent interests). It seems likely, then, that firms would continue to
address patent issues in the public domain world much the same way they
do currently in the FOSS world: carefully.
Another potential drawback of a public domain approach to patents
is that it may mean that the public domain world would be disadvantaged
vis-à-vis the “proprietary” world in terms of patents. That is, those that
243
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adopt the public domain approach may be left defenseless against those that
choose to pursue patents.244 But this potential drawback proves
unconvincing. First, as discussed above, very few FOSS projects currently
pursue patents as it is. Second, for those concerned about being defenseless,
they could either obtain or file for patents before dedicating materials to the
public domain or simply not dedicate them at all.
Ideally the Public Domain Act would also address the issue of
termination of transfers in copyright law. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to address the best method by which to do this; others have devoted
significant scholarship to this issue. But a Public Domain Act could provide
a useful vehicle for finally addressing it.
3. The Public Domain Act in Practice
How would the Public Domain Act work in practice? In the FOSS
context, for instance, would individual developers actually contribute
materials to projects under the public domain without some sort of
assurance that the project would actually make the project itself public
domain? Such an issue would likely be addressed through the contributor
agreements rather than as part of a Public Domain Act. For instance,
individual contributors might provide materials to a project under a public
domain designation so long as the project agrees to make the whole project
available under a public domain designation as well. Most FOSS projects
already operate in a similar manner; the agreement simply indicates that the
contribution will be used under whatever FOSS license the relevant project
has chosen.245
Would creators actually rely on the Public Domain Act and use the
(PD) designation? Those that believe in reciprocity may resist and continue
to use reciprocal licenses for their projects. Others might continue to use IPbased open licenses simply out of inertia or because of greater familiarity
with them. But the Public Domain Act would provide another, simpler
option for making materials available for public consumption. And such an
option, as this Article has argued, presents significant advantages over the
IP-based approach.
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CONCLUSION

Open license movements came at just the right time. In the face of
increasingly aggressive corporate assertions of IP rights, the FOSS and
Creative Commons movements provided powerful checks to those
assertions. They gave a voice and means to many who wished for a world of
creativity and innovation freer than that envisioned in corporate board
rooms. Their vision, and the legal tools architected to help achieve that
vision, have succeeded in helping recast dialogues in both the content and
software worlds.
But at what cost? The legal tools selected, while understandable in
context, suffer from a significant flaw: they rely on the same foundation that
they seek to do away with. This IP “schizophrenia” has had significant
repercussions, as this Article has detailed. Most immediately, it leads to
wasteful transaction costs that inhibit innovation. More futuristically, it
paves the way for significant IP troll activity, especially in the copyright
realm. And generally, it concedes and even implicitly argues in favor of the
legitimacy and necessity of IP rights in the software and content worlds.
What is more, the costs of the IP approach do not appear necessary
in light of actual experience or based on the reasons that innovators choose
to participate in open models of innovation. The anticommons that the IP
approach helps create is not needed to fend off a tragedy of the commons.
Contributors to the commons have come to believe in and understand the
virtues of the commons, and so already have incentives to contribute to it.
This may not have been true at the inception of such open movements, but it
seems clear now. Furthermore, the anticommons arises precisely as a result
of firms taking precautions to avoid the effects of licensing requirements
they deem to be against their interests. The anticommons, therefore, does
not ensure the existence of the commons—it simply makes it less useful.
A public domain approach would eliminate many of the wasteful
costs, both now and in the future, while still satisfying the goals of most
innovators interested in contributing to such a commons. A Public Domain
Act, furthermore, would be a welcome and needed addition to the U.S. IP
statutory regime, providing yet another important path towards “promoting
the sciences and useful arts.”
This Article does not argue, however, that IP rights are unnecessary
or trivial in encouraging innovation. Too much evidence suggests they are
important to encouraging creative and inventive activity in many important
areas. But IP rights are only one option for spurring innovation. The open
models of innovation discussed in this Article provide powerful examples
of how innovation is encouraged in spite of IP rights, not because of them.
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The best way to achieve such movements’ full potential, therefore, is not
through an IP approach, but through a full-throated public domain route.
Open movements may wish to rely on IP rights in their transition to true
openness and freedom. But if such reliance becomes permanent, open
movements give up their birthright. It need not be so.

